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The Making of Modern Ukraine, Class 2: The Genesis of Nations (3)

Class 2: The Genesis of Nations (3)

from their local traditions

and forces them into a kind of melting pot in the city

where the lowest common denominator might be their language.

And so on the basis of their language

and feeling alienated because they're uprooted,

they might seem to think, okay, we're part of a nation

or they'd be vulnerable to politicians

who made that argument.

They also said the modernizing state,

the modernizing state is going to make people literate.

This is what the modernizing state does.

It educates people. It makes people literate.

At the end of the 19th century, early 20th century

in European countries, you go from very low literacy

to very, very high rates of literacy very quickly.

But literacy can also mean

not identifying with an imperial center,

but identifying with a nation

because you're reading perhaps in your own language

or you learn to read in one language,

then you learn to read in a different language.

And so these guys made this argument,

which was then repeated in the 1980s

by a number of national theorists

or these kinds of arguments were made in the 1980s

by some important interesting national theorists

called Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson.

Who also said that the nation is not ancient,

but it's a result of certain kinds of modernization.

So that's the short course on the theories

of where nations come about.

What I'm trying to say is that this argument

about the theory of how nations come about,

goes back almost as far as the nation, right?

So the position that nations aren't old, they're new.

People have been saying that for more than a hundred years.

National theorists will generally say

oh, everyone who talks about the nation, they're stupid.

They're unaware of the fact

that it's politically constructed.

No, no, no.

There's been awareness

that it might be politically constructed

for almost as long as there's been the nation itself.

This discussion that we're having now has been going on

for almost as long as the nation has existed.

Oh, by the way, this Kelles-Krauz guy.

I mention him partly because

he gives two interesting examples for his argument

that the nation is all about modernity

and not about tradition.

And his examples are the Jews and the Ukrainians.

So at the time when he was writing,

which was the early years of the 20th century,

he died in 1905.

So the very early years of the 20th century,

the idea that Jews were a nation

was generally seen as absurd

because they lacked what were thought of then

as the objective attributes of a nation.

For example, territory.

And so Jews can't be a nation.

Ukrainians were thought not to be a nation

because they lacked another objective attribute,

which was a historical political class.

So if your theory of the nation

is that there is certain durable stuff,

like land or like a political class,

and that those make up the nation,

then you look at the Ukrainians and the Jews in 1904

and you'd say, no, they're not nations.

The Hungarians maybe, the Poles maybe,

the Germans certainly, but not the Ukrainians and the Jews.

What Kelles-Krauz said is think about it in a different way.

Bracket what you think about the past,

look at the way modernization affects people right now

and it turns out it doesn't matter he argues,

whether or not there are these

"objective attributes" or not.

All that matters is that modernization

is gonna generate the processes, the alienation,

the urbanization, which are gonna lead people

to these new forms of solidarity.

And so when he said that the Jews and the Ukrainians

were gonna be modern nations in the early 20th century,

that was a very radical argument,

but it was consistent with the theory of the nation,

which says that the nation is a result of modernization.

So that ends the part about the theory of the nation.

I want to close by talking about

how some of our Ukrainians thought about the nation.

So we've talked about the nation in general,

we've talked about theories of the nation.

Now we're gonna talk about

some of how the Ukrainians thought about the nation.

And it's important to be clear

that this whole thing is a very self-conscious process.

The people who made nations knew what they were doing.

They knew what they were doing.

The way they talked about it might be a little different

than how we would talk about it,

but no one slept-walked into nationhood.

That didn't happen that way.

There were larger processes in the background, I think.

We can keep talking about this.

I think the modernization people are right,

that larger processes in the background like urbanization,

like capitalism, like literacy made it likely

that some new form of solidarity would emerge.

But where, and for whom?

Where and for whom?

Why these nations and not other nations?

So again, going back to the point I made at the beginning,

nations mess with the past.

Once they're created, they mess with the past.

They make it very hard for people to process the past.

It's like the periodic table's invented

and then it says everybody do alchemy.

They mess with the past.

And one of the ways the nations mess with the past,

maybe the most profound one is that they convince everyone

that their own existence is self-evident.

So if you're in Poland

and you grow up in the Polish educational system,

many things might be uncertain,

but the existence of Poland is not called into question.

Even in the United States

where there's so many obvious contingencies.

So many obvious contingencies.

It's very difficult to argue that the United States,

that the revolution of 1776 had to happen

or that the Americans had to win

or in 1812, they had to win.

I mean, they should have lost in 1812.

We, sorry, should have lost in 1812.

You know, the Louisiana Purchase.

All this stuff, it obviously didn't have to happen,

or the border with Canada, totally arbitrary.

I don't mean that in an aggressive way,

if there are any Canadians out there.

It's cool. It's cool.

It's fine with me.

But even if you come to an American school system,

the existence of America

isn't gonna be called into question, right?

The first class, the teacher's not gonna say, "By the way,

America didn't have to be.

Maybe it shouldn't have been. Maybe that would've been cool.

What if the British Empire had been here longer?

Maybe that would've been better."

I'm gonna guess that didn't happen

in any of your classes, right?

All right. So we'll find out where you went to school.

But the basic idea is the nation makes itself self-evident.

But it isn't, right? It isn't.

So when we study Ukraine,

we're gonna be studying the formation of a political nation.

But what I don't want to think is,

wow, Ukraine is really special 'cause it's political

and all the other nations are real.

That's a lesson that I don't want you to draw.

I want you to think 'hah, this is interesting'

how the Ukrainian nation

is maybe a little more self-consciously political

or maybe it's been forced into circumstances

which reveal the political character of the nation

to our eyes a little more clearly

than with the French or the Americans or whatever.

But I don't want you to think,

oh yeah, the Ukrainians are kind of funky,

but everyone else has a rock solid tradition.

I don't want you to think that.

I want you to think, oh,

as we've studied the Ukrainian nation,

we're gonna see patterns which maybe actually help us

to understand the Poles better or the Russians better,

or even the Americans and the British and the French better.

So how did the Ukrainians think about themselves?

In the 19th century,

the main move in the Russian Empire and don't worry,

this is all gonna become clear

when the Russian Empire starts and when it ends and so on.

For now I just need you to know that in the 19th century,

most people who spoke the Ukrainian language

were in the Russian Empire.

And in the Russian Empire in the 19th century,

the second half, there was this idea of going to the people

which was called populism.

So not populism in the sense that you're used to,

populism now means, I don't know what it means, honestly,

but it means something like if you...

Okay, I'm not gonna go down that road.

When people say populism, they generally mean something

that's not liberalism that we don't like.

But populism in this sense meant going to the people

and trying to figure out who the people were.

It was an urban movement in the Russian Empire

associated with the science of what was then called

ethnography that we now call anthropology.

Very influential in literature.

Dostoevsky starts out being this way

and then goes to prison and actually meets people

and changes his mind about how great they are,

which is an interesting story.

So going to the people

and so one source of the Ukrainian national identity

is this empirical contact with the people

in the Russian Empire where you realize,

huh, their folklore and their songs

and their language are different.

They're different.

They just are different than the peoples further north,

the people who we now call the Russians.

And so you go to the people

and you discover that the society,

if you take it on its own terms,

is just a little bit different

and you start thinking about that.

That populism leads to something

which we now call social history,

where you locate the nation.

That's the Ukrainian historian who did this,

where you locate the nation in its own self-understanding,

in its customs, in its songs,

in its stories, in its language.

So in the 19th century, that's a very strong movement.

And so you then say, okay, the nation has always been there

or it's been there for a really long time,

but it's not politically represented and that's the problem.

That's the problem.

So you're replacing the kinds of

legitimating political stories we talked about before

with a different political legitimating story.

So it's not the czar or the Polish landlords

who should control politics, it should be the people

because they've been here for a long time

and look how numerous they are.

And if you look at their customs,

you can see that they're in fact a unity.

That's populism, that's social history,

that's going to the people.

And of course Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi

wrote the very, very long history which justifies all this.

There's a stage in the 19th century

where you have to write a very long history

in order to esta--

I don't mean to make it sound like a joke,

'cause it's not easy, but you have to write a long history

to document the continuity of the people

where social history is in the foreground

and the political history is in the background

and that's a radical reversal.

Until then, generally you could write history

with just the politics

and the people didn't have to be present really at all.

Now, the weakness of this or a tendency within this

is that it will tend to move you

towards an ethnic understanding of what the nation is.

Because where you're identifying the nation

is in its customs and its language and so on.

Well, what if there are other people,

I've already mentioned the Greeks and the Jews,

there are probably others in Ukraine, we'll get to them.

But what if there are other people

who don't speak the same language

or who have markedly different customs?

What do you do with them?

That's the problem of ethnicity.

That if you define the nation in terms of customs,

then that always is going to raise the question

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Class 2: The Genesis of Nations (3) ||Genesis|| Klasse 2: Die Entstehung der Nationen (3) Class 2: The Genesis of Nations (3) Clase 2: La génesis de las naciones (3) Classe 2 : La genèse des nations (3) Classe 2: La genesi delle nazioni (3) クラス2:国家創世記(3) 2 klasė: Tautų genezė (3) Les 2: Het ontstaan van naties (3) Klasa 2: Geneza narodów (3) Aula 2: A Génese das Nações (3) Занятие 2: Генезис наций (3) Sınıf 2: Ulusların Yaratılışı (3) Заняття 2: Походження націй (3) 第二课:国家的起源(3) 第二課:萬國起源(3)

from their local traditions aus ihren lokalen Traditionen

and forces them into a kind of melting pot in the city und zwingt sie in eine Art Schmelztiegel in der Stadt и заставляет их превратиться в своего рода плавильный котел в городе і змушуючи їх потрапляти у своєрідний тигель у місті

where the lowest common denominator might be their language. ||||common factor|||| wobei der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner ihre Sprache sein könnte. де найменшим спільним знаменником може бути їх мова.

And so on the basis of their language Und so auf der Grundlage ihrer Sprache И так на основе их языка І так на підставі їх мови

and feeling alienated because they're uprooted, ||isolated disconnected|||displaced or removed und sich entfremdet fühlen, weil sie entwurzelt sind, и чувствуя себя отчужденными, потому что они вырваны с корнем,

they might seem to think, okay, we're part of a nation

or they'd be vulnerable to politicians |||open to influence|| |||عرضة|| oder sie wären anfällig für Politiker

who made that argument. wer hat das argument gemacht.

They also said the modernizing state, ||||updating|

the modernizing state is going to make people literate. |upgrading|||||||able to read der sich modernisierende Staat wird die Menschen belesen machen. модернизирующееся государство сделает людей грамотными.

This is what the modernizing state does.

It educates people. It makes people literate. |teaches|||||able to read

At the end of the 19th century, early 20th century

in European countries, you go from very low literacy ||||||||reading and writing

to very, very high rates of literacy very quickly.

But literacy can also mean

not identifying with an imperial center,

but identifying with a nation

because you're reading perhaps in your own language

or you learn to read in one language,

then you learn to read in a different language.

And so these guys made this argument,

which was then repeated in the 1980s

by a number of national theorists

or these kinds of arguments were made in the 1980s

by some important interesting national theorists

called Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. ||Gellner||| позвонили Эрнесту Геллнеру и Бенедикту Андерсону.

Who also said that the nation is not ancient, Кто же сказал, что нация не древняя,

but it's a result of certain kinds of modernization.

So that's the short course on the theories

of where nations come about. ||||concerning davon, wo Nationen entstehen.

What I'm trying to say is that this argument

about the theory of how nations come about,

goes back almost as far as the nation, right? ||||distant|||| geht fast so weit zurück wie die Nation, richtig?

So the position that nations aren't old, they're new.

People have been saying that for more than a hundred years.

National theorists will generally say

oh, everyone who talks about the nation, they're stupid.

They're unaware of the fact Sie sind sich der Tatsache nicht bewusst

that it's politically constructed.

No, no, no.

There's been awareness

that it might be politically constructed dass es politisch konstruiert sein könnte

for almost as long as there's been the nation itself. fast so lange, wie es die Nation selbst gibt.

This discussion that we're having now has been going on

for almost as long as the nation has existed.

Oh, by the way, this Kelles-Krauz guy.

I mention him partly because Ich erwähne ihn teilweise, weil

he gives two interesting examples for his argument

that the nation is all about modernity ||||||modern times dass die Nation sich nur um die Moderne dreht

and not about tradition. und nicht über Tradition.

And his examples are the Jews and the Ukrainians.

So at the time when he was writing,

which was the early years of the 20th century,

he died in 1905.

So the very early years of the 20th century,

the idea that Jews were a nation

was generally seen as absurd

because they lacked what were thought of then weil ihnen fehlte, woran man damals dachte

as the objective attributes of a nation. ||goal|attributes||| als objektive Attribute einer Nation.

For example, territory.

And so Jews can't be a nation.

Ukrainians were thought not to be a nation Die Ukrainer galten nicht als Nation

because they lacked another objective attribute, weil ihnen ein anderes objektives Attribut fehlte,

which was a historical political class.

So if your theory of the nation

is that there is certain durable stuff, |||||durable| ist, dass es bestimmte haltbare Sachen gibt,

like land or like a political class,

and that those make up the nation,

then you look at the Ukrainians and the Jews in 1904

and you'd say, no, they're not nations.

The Hungarians maybe, the Poles maybe,

the Germans certainly, but not the Ukrainians and the Jews.

What Kelles-Krauz said is think about it in a different way.

Bracket what you think about the past, Enclose|||||| ماذا||||||

look at the way modernization affects people right now Schauen Sie sich an, wie sich die Modernisierung gerade jetzt auf die Menschen auswirkt посмотрите, как модернизация влияет на людей прямо сейчас

and it turns out it doesn't matter he argues, und es stellt sich heraus, dass es egal ist, dass er argumentiert,

whether or not there are these

"objective attributes" or not.

All that matters is that modernization

is gonna generate the processes, the alienation, ||||||estrangement

the urbanization, which are gonna lead people |city development||||| |التحضر|||||

to these new forms of solidarity. |||||unity or support

And so when he said that the Jews and the Ukrainians

were gonna be modern nations in the early 20th century,

that was a very radical argument, ||||جذري|

but it was consistent with the theory of the nation,

which says that the nation is a result of modernization. that|||||||||

So that ends the part about the theory of the nation.

I want to close by talking about

how some of our Ukrainians thought about the nation.

So we've talked about the nation in general,

we've talked about theories of the nation.

Now we're gonna talk about

some of how the Ukrainians thought about the nation.

And it's important to be clear

that this whole thing is a very self-conscious process. dass das Ganze ein sehr selbstbewusster Prozess ist. что все это очень самосознательный процесс.

The people who made nations knew what they were doing.

They knew what they were doing.

The way they talked about it might be a little different

than how we would talk about it,

but no one slept-walked into nationhood. |||slept|||state of independence ||||||nacionalidad aber niemand schlafwandelte in die Nation.

That didn't happen that way.

There were larger processes in the background, I think.

We can keep talking about this.

I think the modernization people are right,

that larger processes in the background like urbanization,

like capitalism, like literacy made it likely |||reading skills|||

that some new form of solidarity would emerge. |||||unity||

But where, and for whom? ||||for whom

Where and for whom?

Why these nations and not other nations?

So again, going back to the point I made at the beginning,

nations mess with the past. Nationen spielen mit der Vergangenheit. народы связываются с прошлым.

Once they're created, they mess with the past. Sobald sie erstellt sind, spielen sie mit der Vergangenheit herum. Quando são criados, mexem com o passado. Створені, вони втручаються в минуле.

They make it very hard for people to process the past. ||||||||||history Sie machen es den Menschen sehr schwer, die Vergangenheit zu verarbeiten. Из-за них людям очень трудно обрабатывать прошлое.

It's like the periodic table's invented |||regular structure|table| Es ist, als wäre das Periodensystem erfunden É como se a tabela periódica tivesse sido inventada Це як винахід періодичної таблиці

and then it says everybody do alchemy. ||||||alchemy und dann heißt es, dass alle Alchemie betreiben. e depois diz que toda a gente faz alquimia. і потім вони кажуть усім займатися алхімією.

They mess with the past. Sie spielen mit der Vergangenheit. 彼らは過去に干渉する。 Вони ламають минуле.

And one of the ways the nations mess with the past,

maybe the most profound one is that they convince everyone vielleicht ist die tiefgreifendste, dass sie alle überzeugen

that their own existence is self-evident. dass ihre eigene Existenz selbstverständlich ist. что их собственное существование самоочевидно.

So if you're in Poland

and you grow up in the Polish educational system,

many things might be uncertain,

but the existence of Poland is not called into question. aber die Existenz Polens wird nicht in Frage gestellt.

Even in the United States

where there's so many obvious contingencies. |||||unforeseen events wo es so viele offensichtliche Eventualitäten gibt.

So many obvious contingencies. |||possibilities |||احتمالات

It's very difficult to argue that the United States,

that the revolution of 1776 had to happen

or that the Americans had to win

or in 1812, they had to win.

I mean, they should have lost in 1812.

We, sorry, should have lost in 1812. ||deberíamos haber|||

You know, the Louisiana Purchase. |||لويزيانا| ||||acquisition Sie wissen schon, der Kauf von Louisiana.

All this stuff, it obviously didn't have to happen, All dieses Zeug, es hätte offensichtlich nicht passieren müssen,

or the border with Canada, totally arbitrary. ||||||Randomly chosen ||||||عشوائي

I don't mean that in an aggressive way,

if there are any Canadians out there. ob es da draußen irgendwelche Kanadier gibt.

It's cool. It's cool. Es ist cool. Es ist cool.

It's fine with me.

But even if you come to an American school system,

the existence of America

isn't gonna be called into question, right?

The first class, the teacher's not gonna say, "By the way, ||||instructor's||||||

America didn't have to be.

Maybe it shouldn't have been. Maybe that would've been cool. |||||||would have|| Vielleicht hätte es nicht sein sollen. Vielleicht wäre das cool gewesen.

What if the British Empire had been here longer?

Maybe that would've been better."

I'm gonna guess that didn't happen

in any of your classes, right?

All right. So we'll find out where you went to school. Muito bem. Então vamos descobrir onde andou na escola.

But the basic idea is the nation makes itself self-evident. Но основная идея заключается в том, что нация делает себя самоочевидной.

But it isn't, right? It isn't.

So when we study Ukraine,

we're gonna be studying the formation of a political nation.

But what I don't want to think is,

wow, Ukraine is really special 'cause it's political

and all the other nations are real.

That's a lesson that I don't want you to draw. Das ist eine Lektion, die ich nicht will, dass du sie ziehst. Это урок, который я не хочу, чтобы вы выучили.

I want you to think 'hah, this is interesting'

how the Ukrainian nation

is maybe a little more self-consciously political ist vielleicht etwas selbstbewusster politisch

or maybe it's been forced into circumstances ||||||situations

which reveal the political character of the nation die den politischen Charakter der Nation offenbaren

to our eyes a little more clearly

than with the French or the Americans or whatever.

But I don't want you to think,

oh yeah, the Ukrainians are kind of funky, أوه|||||||غريب |||||||unconventional or cool о да, украинцы какие-то обалденные, о, так, українці трохи фанкові,

but everyone else has a rock solid tradition. aber alle anderen haben eine felsenfeste Tradition. но у всех остальных есть прочная традиция. але у всіх інших є міцна традиція.

I don't want you to think that. Я не хочу, щоб ви так думали.

I want you to think, oh,

as we've studied the Ukrainian nation,

we're gonna see patterns which maybe actually help us

to understand the Poles better or the Russians better, чтобы лучше понимать поляков или лучше русских,

or even the Americans and the British and the French better.

So how did the Ukrainians think about themselves?

In the 19th century,

the main move in the Russian Empire and don't worry,

this is all gonna become clear

when the Russian Empire starts and when it ends and so on.

For now I just need you to know that in the 19th century,

most people who spoke the Ukrainian language

were in the Russian Empire.

And in the Russian Empire in the 19th century,

the second half, there was this idea of going to the people In der zweiten Hälfte gab es diese Idee, zu den Leuten zu gehen

which was called populism. |||the people's movement |||الشعبوية

So not populism in the sense that you're used to,

populism now means, I don't know what it means, honestly,

but it means something like if you...

Okay, I'm not gonna go down that road. Okay, ich werde diesen Weg nicht gehen.

When people say populism, they generally mean something

that's not liberalism that we don't like. ||liberal ideology|||| ||ليبرالية|||| Das ist nicht der Liberalismus, den wir nicht mögen. это не либерализм, который нам не нравится.

But populism in this sense meant going to the people

and trying to figure out who the people were. und versuchte herauszufinden, wer die Leute waren.

It was an urban movement in the Russian Empire |||حضري||||| Es war eine städtische Bewegung im Russischen Reich

associated with the science of what was then called in Verbindung mit der Wissenschaft von dem, was man damals als

ethnography that we now call anthropology. cultural study||||| الإثنوغرافيا|||||

Very influential in literature.

Dostoevsky starts out being this way Dostoyevski|||||

and then goes to prison and actually meets people und dann ins Gefängnis geht und tatsächlich Menschen trifft

and changes his mind about how great they are,

which is an interesting story.

So going to the people

and so one source of the Ukrainian national identity und damit eine Quelle der ukrainischen nationalen Identität

is this empirical contact with the people ||practical interaction|||| ist dieser empirische Kontakt mit den Menschen

in the Russian Empire where you realize,

huh, their folklore and their songs ||traditional stories||| ||الفولكلور|||

and their language are different.

They're different.

They just are different than the peoples further north, Они просто другие, чем народы дальше на север,

the people who we now call the Russians.

And so you go to the people

and you discover that the society,

if you take it on its own terms,

is just a little bit different

and you start thinking about that.

That populism leads to something

which we now call social history,

where you locate the nation.

That's the Ukrainian historian who did this,

where you locate the nation in its own self-understanding,

in its customs, in its songs, in seinen Bräuchen, in seinen Liedern,

in its stories, in its language.

So in the 19th century, that's a very strong movement.

And so you then say, okay, the nation has always been there

or it's been there for a really long time,

but it's not politically represented and that's the problem. aber sie ist politisch nicht vertreten, und das ist das Problem.

That's the problem.

So you're replacing the kinds of ||substituting|||

legitimating political stories we talked about before validating||||||

with a different political legitimating story. ||||justification narrative|narrative

So it's not the czar or the Polish landlords ||||ruler||||property owners ||||القيصر||||المالكون

who should control politics, it should be the people

because they've been here for a long time

and look how numerous they are. und schau, wie zahlreich sie sind.

And if you look at their customs,

you can see that they're in fact a unity.

That's populism, that's social history,

that's going to the people.

And of course Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi |||Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi|Hrushevski

wrote the very, very long history which justifies all this. |||||||explains why||

There's a stage in the 19th century Es gibt eine Bühne im 19. Jahrhundert

where you have to write a very long history

in order to esta--

I don't mean to make it sound like a joke,

'cause it's not easy, but you have to write a long history

to document the continuity of the people |||continuity|||the population

where social history is in the foreground ||||||main focus ||||||المقدمة

and the political history is in the background ||السياسية|||||الخلفية

and that's a radical reversal. ||||complete turnaround

Until then, generally you could write history

with just the politics

and the people didn't have to be present really at all. e as pessoas não precisavam de estar presentes de facto.

Now, the weakness of this or a tendency within this ||vulnerability|||||||

is that it will tend to move you ist, dass es dazu neigt, Sie zu bewegen

towards an ethnic understanding of what the nation is. ||عرقي||||||

Because where you're identifying the nation |||recognizing||

is in its customs and its language and so on.

Well, what if there are other people,

I've already mentioned the Greeks and the Jews,

there are probably others in Ukraine, we'll get to them.

But what if there are other people

who don't speak the same language

or who have markedly different customs? |||significantly|| або які мають помітно відмінні звичаї?

What do you do with them?

That's the problem of ethnicity. ||||racial identity

That if you define the nation in terms of customs,

then that always is going to raise the question