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Crash Course 2: Philosophy., 11b. Intelligent Design. Part 2/2.

11b. Intelligent Design. Part 2/2.

{Video: 04:11}

Next objection: Some parts of nature seem to be without purpose. A blind spot obviously doesn't have any function, and neither do nipples on a man. Paley's response here was: Just because we don't know there's a purpose doesn't mean there isn't one. But this is a problem, too, because his whole argument for believing in God is that you should look at the world and see purpose. So if we see some things in the world that are working great, and really seem to have complexity and a definite use, and others that don't, that's a flaw in his argument. What's more, the absence of any obvious purpose in things can lead people to start searching for purposes, and effectively make them up. For instance, I could find a purpose for this finger – I could use it as a nose-picker. It would make a good one – it's just the right size to really get in there and dig around. But was my finger designed to pick noses?

Probably not. 20th century British philosopher Bertrand Russell made fun of this purpose-finding tendency, by pointing out that you could look at a bunny and form the belief that God gave it a fuzzy white tail so hunters would have something to shoot at.

The point is: If we're the ones inventing purposes, rather than recognizing ones that are inherently there, then we're the real creators of purpose in the world, not God. Basically, if you believe that God made eyes for seeing, then you also have to believe that he designed fingers as nose-pickers, and rabbit tails as bullseyes, and blind spots as ways for us to get into car accidents. So the counterargument here is: We don't get to just pick and choose, and say God designed the stuff we want him to have designed, and not the other stuff. Rather than searching for disanalogies, another way Paley's argument has been countered is with an alternative explanation for Condition B. Paley says bodies are purposeful, and from there concludes that the purpose had to have been put there by an intelligent creator. But another explanation for how bodies came to have the complexity and functionality they have today, is natural selection and random mutation. We can concede that the existence of a designer-god helped make sense of the origins the our world in a pre-scientific age, but now we have a perfectly good scientific explanation for how the complexity of the world came about.

So, who needs a watchmaker when you have evolution by natural selection? Another objection to Paley's case came from 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who pointed out that, if we're to take the analogy seriously, we'd need to conclude that the creator that Paley posits seems to make a lot of mistakes. And not just blind spots. Like, how about hurricanes? Or why would he make our bodies with certain tissues -- like in the breast, or prostate, or colon -- that are so incredibly prone to cancer? Why would he make umbilical cords that could wrap around a baby's neck? Why would he make butterflies have to wait for hours, immobile, for their wings dry as soon as they come out of their chrysalis, making them easy prey for predators? Hume pointed out that the world is chock full of stuff that looks cruel, ridiculous, impractical, and contrary to life. A flawed world, he said, implies a flawed creator.

Now, the development of evolutionary biology over the past couple hundred years has taken a pretty heavy toll on the teleological argument. But it still has many supporters, and their method of defending their view is a good model for the way the Socratic method is supposed to work.

When your opponents raise objections to your theory, you need to either reject it, or modify it in a way that responds to those objections. So, supporters of the teleological argument set out to modify – and strengthen – their view.

Here are a couple of modern responses: Contemporary British philosopher Richard Swinburne gives us a modern teleological argument with a twist of probability. He says that, even if there's another possible explanation for the universe, we should go with the explanation that's most likely to be true. And he says that it's simply more probable that God designed the world, than that it came about through the pure chance of evolutionary processes. Likewise, another class of modern defenses of the teleological argument are collectively known as Fine-Tuning Arguments. These arguments accept the Big Bang and evolution as scientific truths, but they maintain that, for the evolution of life to occur, it's most likely that God set up the precise conditions that it required, rather than them coming about by accident. After all, if Earth were just a little closer to, or farther from, the sun… If the composition of our atmosphere was slightly different… If the content of our oceans was something other than what it is … Life would have never taken root.

A lot of people think these modernized arguments have more going for them than Paley's did. This is partly because these types of teleologists have moved from making assertions about certainty to making claims about probability, which seem easier to get right and to defend. Objectors will counter by saying that the problem with these arguments is, you can't really make a probability claim when you only have a sample set of one. If we had multiple Earths that we could examine, we could see how likely any particular adaptation is, or how unique the conditions for life are. Then we would know if it were likely or unlikely to happen without God. But we can't know that -- at least not now -- because we can only access this one world, where we know that things evolved as they did. Thus, the counterargument goes, Swinburne and other modern teleologists are right to recognize that if things were slightly different, then life maybe wouldn't have evolved or would have evolved very differently. But that is wholly different from claiming that it's unlikely to have happened in the first place. So, today you learned about the teleological argument, objections to it, and responses to those objections, and the responses to the responses to the objections. But we've spent an awful lot of time talking about God's existence, so next time, let's consider what god is like if it exists. This episode is brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace helps to create websites, blogs or online stores for you and your ideas. Websites look professionally designed regardless of skill level, no coding required. Try Squarespace at squarespace.com/crashcourse for a special offer.

Crash Course Philosophy is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios. You can head over to their channel and check out amazing shows like The Art Assignment, The Good Stuff, and Blank on Blank.

This episode of Crash Course was filmed in the Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio with the help of all of these amazing people and our equally fantastic graphics team is Thought Cafe.

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11b. Intelligent Design. Part 2/2. 11b. Intelligenter Entwurf. Teil 2/2. 11b. El diseño inteligente. Parte 2/2. 11b. Le dessein intelligent. Partie 2/2. 11b.インテリジェント・デザインパート2/2. 11b. 지능형 디자인. 2부/2. 11b. Intelligent ontwerp. Deel 2/2. 11b. Интеллектуальный дизайн. Часть 2/2. 11b. Розумний задум. Частина 2/2. 11b.智能设计。第 2/2 部分。

{Video: 04:11}

Next objection: Some parts of nature seem to be without purpose. A blind spot obviously doesn't have any function, and neither do nipples on a man. Un punto ciego obviamente no tiene ninguna función, como tampoco la tienen los pezones en un hombre. Paley's response here was: Just because we don't know there's a purpose doesn't mean there isn't one. But this is a problem, too, because his whole argument for believing in God is that you should look at the world and see purpose. So if we see some things in the world that are working great, and really seem to have complexity and a definite use, and others that don't, that's a flaw in his argument. What's more, the absence of any obvious purpose in things can lead people to start searching for purposes, and effectively make them up. 此外,事物中没有明显目的会导致人们开始寻找目的,并有效地进行编造。 For instance, I could find a purpose for this finger – I could use it as a nose-picker. 举个例子,我可以为这根手指找一个用途 - 我可以用它来挖鼻孔。 It would make a good one – it's just the right size to really get in there and dig around. 它会是个不错的选择 - 它的尺寸正好适合深入挖掘。 But was my finger designed to pick noses?

Probably not. 20th century British philosopher Bertrand Russell made fun of this purpose-finding tendency, by pointing out that you could look at a bunny and form the belief that God gave it a fuzzy white tail so hunters would have something to shoot at. 20世纪英国哲学家伯特兰·罗素嘲笑了这种寻找目的的倾向,指出你可能会看着一只兔子并相信上帝给了它一根蓬松的白尾巴,以便猎人有东西可以射击。

The point is: If we're the ones inventing purposes, rather than recognizing ones that are inherently there, then we're the real creators of purpose in the world, not God. 关键是:如果我们是在发明目的,而不是认可那些固有的目的,那么我们才是世界上真正的目的创造者,而不是上帝。 Basically, if you believe that God made eyes for seeing, then you also have to believe that he designed fingers as nose-pickers, and rabbit tails as bullseyes, and blind spots as ways for us to get into car accidents. 基本上,如果你相信上帝为眼睛而创造,那么你也必须相信他设计手指作为挖鼻孔的,兔子尾巴作为靶心,盲点作为我们发生车祸的方式。 So the counterargument here is: We don't get to just pick and choose, and say God designed the stuff we want him to have designed, and not the other stuff. 因此,在这里的反驳是:我们不能自行挑选,说上帝设计了我们想要他设计的东西,而没有设计其他东西。 Rather than searching for disanalogies, another way Paley's argument has been countered is with an alternative explanation for Condition B. Paley says bodies are purposeful, and from there concludes that the purpose had to have been put there by an intelligent creator. 与其寻找不相似之处,另一种反驳 Paley 论点的方法是提出对条件B的另一种解释。Paley认为人体是有目的的,然后由此得出结论:这个目的必须是由一个智慧的创造者放置的。 But another explanation for how bodies came to have the complexity and functionality they have today, is natural selection and random mutation. 但对于人体如何拥有今天的复杂性和功能性,另一个解释是自然选择和随机突变。 We can concede that the existence of a designer-god helped make sense of the origins the our world in a pre-scientific age, but now we have a perfectly good scientific explanation for how the complexity of the world came about. 我们可以承认,在一个非科学时代,存在一个设计者神有助于解释我们世界的起源,但现在我们有一个完全合理的科学解释,解释了世界复杂性是如何形成的。

So, who needs a watchmaker when you have evolution by natural selection? 那么,当有自然选择的进化时,谁还需要一个钟表制造商呢? Another objection to Paley's case came from 18th century Scottish philosopher David Hume, who pointed out that, if we're to take the analogy seriously, we'd need to conclude that the creator that Paley posits seems to make a lot of mistakes. 对Paley的论点的另一个异议来自18世纪苏格兰哲学家大卫·休谬,他指出,如果我们要认真对待这个类比,我们需要得出结论,Paley所架构的创造者似乎犯了很多错误。 And not just blind spots. Like, how about hurricanes? Or why would he make our bodies with certain tissues -- like in the breast, or prostate, or colon -- that are so incredibly prone to cancer? 又或者为什么他会用某些组织制造我们的身体,比如乳房、前列腺或结肠,它们如此容易患癌症呢? Why would he make umbilical cords that could wrap around a baby's neck? 为什么他要制造可以缠绕住婴儿脖子的脐带呢? Why would he make butterflies have to wait for hours, immobile, for their wings dry as soon as they come out of their chrysalis, making them easy prey for predators? 为什么他要让蝴蝶在出蛹后要等待几个小时,一动不动地等待它们的翅膀干燥,使它们容易成为捕食者的猎物呢? Hume pointed out that the world is chock full of stuff that looks cruel, ridiculous, impractical, and contrary to life. 休谟指出,世界充斥着看起来残酷、荒谬、不切实际和违背生活原则的东西。 A flawed world, he said, implies a flawed creator. 他说,一个有缺陷的世界意味着有一个有缺陷的造物主。

Now, the development of evolutionary biology over the past couple hundred years has taken a pretty heavy toll on the teleological argument. 现在,过去几百年来进化生物学的发展对目的论论证造成了相当大的损失。 But it still has many supporters, and their method of defending their view is a good model for the way the Socratic method is supposed to work. 但它仍然有许多支持者,他们捍卫自己观点的方法是苏格拉底方法应该运作的良好模型。

When your opponents raise objections to your theory, you need to either reject it, or modify it in a way that responds to those objections. 当你的对手对你的理论提出异议时,你需要要么拒绝它,要么修改它以回应这些异议。 So, supporters of the teleological argument set out to modify – and strengthen – their view. 因此,目的论论点的支持者致力于修改 - 并加强 - 他们的观点。

Here are a couple of modern responses: Contemporary British philosopher Richard Swinburne gives us a modern teleological argument with a twist of probability. 以下是一些现代的观点:当代英国哲学家理查德·斯温伯恩给我们提供了一个带有概率转折的现代目的论论证。 He says that, even if there's another possible explanation for the universe, we should go with the explanation that's most likely to be true. 他认为,即使宇宙有另一种可能的解释,我们也应该选择最有可能是真实的解释。 And he says that it's simply more probable that God designed the world, than that it came about through the pure chance of evolutionary processes. 他说,与通过进化过程的纯偶然性产生世界相比,更有可能的是上帝设计了这个世界。 Likewise, another class of modern defenses of the teleological argument are collectively known as Fine-Tuning Arguments. 同样,另一类现代支持目的论论证的防御被统称为精细调节论证。 These arguments accept the Big Bang and evolution as scientific truths, but they maintain that, for the evolution of life to occur, it's most likely that God set up the precise conditions that it required, rather than them coming about by accident. 这些论点接受大爆炸和进化为科学真理,但他们认为,为了生命的进化发生,最有可能的是上帝设定了所需的精准条件,而不是它们偶然发生。 After all, if Earth were just a little closer to, or farther from, the sun… If the composition of our atmosphere was slightly different… If the content of our oceans was something other than what it is … Life would have never taken root. 毕竟,如果地球离太阳近一点,或者远一点...如果我们大气层的组成略有不同...如果我们的海洋的含量与现在不同...生命就永远不会生根。

A lot of people think these modernized arguments have more going for them than Paley's did. 许多人认为这些现代化的论点比Paley的更具说服力。 This is partly because these types of teleologists have moved from making assertions about certainty to making claims about probability, which seem easier to get right and to defend. 这部分是因为这些类型的目的论者已经从对确定性的断言转向了对概率的主张,这似乎更容易做到正确和辩护。 Objectors will counter by saying that the problem with these arguments is, you can't really make a probability claim when you only have a sample set of one. 反对者会反驳说,这些论点的问题在于,当你只有一个样本集时,你实际上不能提出概率主张。 If we had multiple Earths that we could examine, we could see how likely any particular adaptation is, or how unique the conditions for life are. 如果我们有多个地球可以考察,我们就可以看到任何特定适应性有多大可能发生,或者生命条件有多独特。 Then we would know if it were likely or unlikely to happen without God. 那么我们就会知道这是否可能在没有上帝的情况下发生。 But we can't know that -- at least not now -- because we can only access this one world, where we know that things evolved as they did. 但我们无法知道 -- 至少现在不知道 -- 因为我们只能接触这个世界,在这个世界我们知道事物演化成了它们的样子。 Thus, the counterargument goes, Swinburne and other modern teleologists are right to recognize that if things were slightly different, then life maybe wouldn't have evolved or would have evolved very differently. But that is wholly different from claiming that it's unlikely to have happened in the first place. 但这与声称它在第一次发生时不太可能发生是完全不同的。 So, today you learned about the teleological argument, objections to it, and responses to those objections, and the responses to the responses to the objections. 所以,今天你学到了有关目的论论点、对其的反对意见以及对这些反对意见的回应,以及对这些反对意见的回应的回应。 But we've spent an awful lot of time talking about God's existence, so next time, let's consider what god is like if it exists. 但我们已经花了大量时间讨论上帝的存在,所以下次让我们考虑一下,如果上帝存在,上帝是什么样子。 This episode is brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace helps to create websites, blogs or online stores for you and your ideas. Websites look professionally designed regardless of skill level, no coding required. Try Squarespace at squarespace.com/crashcourse for a special offer.

Crash Course Philosophy is produced in association with PBS Digital Studios. You can head over to their channel and check out amazing shows like The Art Assignment, The Good Stuff, and Blank on Blank.

This episode of Crash Course was filmed in the Doctor Cheryl C. Kinney Crash Course Studio with the help of all of these amazing people and our equally fantastic graphics team is Thought Cafe.