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Matt's Today in History, What Price Victory, August 6, 1945 (Part 1)

What Price Victory, August 6, 1945 (Part 1)

Every outcome in history has at least one alternative, that path that was not followed. If you've listened to this podcast for a couple of years or more, you have heard a similar version of tonight's episode. This is one of the few times that, instead of exploring just the event as it occurred, we also take a look at the other likely path. Why? Because that other branch of the tree of history was the one that most of the world thought would be the one to play out. The path that was not chosen was also well-planned for by the groups involved because almost all the decision-makers were kept in the dark about one huge fact. This is amazingly rare in modern history.

On August 6, 1945, a United States Army Air Corps B-29 bomber named 'Enola Gay' dropped a uranium fission bomb codenamed “Little Boy” over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. On August 9, a B-29 named 'Bock's Car' dropped a bomb with a plutonium core named “Fat Man” on Nagasaki. These two dates remain the only times nuclear weapons have been used for their original intended purpose: to destroy population centers along with an enemy's ability and desire to wage war. For seven decades, the world has debated the wisdom and morality of the use of these weapons. To better understand the reasoning at work in the minds of Allied leaders and war planners, it is important to look at the events leading up to these August, 1945, dates and consider one of the greatest ‘what if' scenarios of not just the Second World War, but of all modern military history. By the summer of 1945, the Empire of Japan had ceased being a threat in most areas of the Pacific theater of war. Okinawa, only 340 miles from mainland Japan, was secured by U.S. Army and Marine Corps divisions by the end of June. While significant Japanese ground forces remained active in China and Korea, the Allies had destroyed the Imperial Navy over the course of the previous three-and-a-half years, leaving her coastal cities open to shelling from the battleships and heavy cruisers of the U.S. and British Pacific fleets. The Japanese air force, while numerically still a presence, was all but grounded due to a lack of fuel. Every major city in the Japanese home islands had been at least partially leveled by daily U.S. Army Air Corps bombing raids. The Japanese merchant fleet, once one of the world's largest, had ceased to exist. The island nation was cut off.

Yet, the remains of the once-vast empire fought on. There was a strong belief among the military leaders of Japan that a successful invasion of the four main Japanese home islands would mean the end of the nation as a distinct cultural entity. The hardliners believed that surrender was not an option and that an Allied invasion required the entire population to fight to the point of extinction. There were voices of moderation in Tokyo, one of them being the Emperor of Japan. However, tradition demanded that he remain officially silent. He had made his desire for a negotiated peace clear, however, in private discussions with his ministers. The Emperor wanted the Soviet Union (who was not yet at war with Japan) to act as a mediator between the warring powers in the Pacific. However, he also wanted some sort of concrete victory in order to gain leverage during the negotiations. But by the end of June, 1945, it was clear there would be no great Japanese victory on Okinawa or anywhere else. Furthermore, the Soviets were not interested in brokering a deal of any sort: Josef Stalin had his own plans.

Meanwhile, the war in Europe ended in early May, 1945. While the occupation of Germany and Eastern Europe and post-war actions of the Allies had been discussed on multiple occasions since early in the conflict, there were still many details which needed to be sorted out. Beginning on July 17th, leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union met in Potsdam, Germany to discuss both the issues of occupation and the war in the Pacific. President Harry Truman, who had come to the office after the death of President Roosevelt in April, arrived at the conference with monumental but secret knowledge: an atomic bomb had been successfully tested in the New Mexico desert just one day before the beginning of the conference. Three years of super-secret work and billions of dollars had resulted in the construction of the most deadly weapon in human history. Yet only a handful of people not working directly on the device knew that it even existed. Truman himself was not made aware of the bomb's pending completion until after Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, despite the fact he had been the Vice-President. Truman met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill on July 21st, at which time the two agreed on the use of the weapon. Soviet Premier Stalin was not told until July 25th, a delay which made him privately angry but only because his advice on the weapon's use was not sought as Churchill's had been. In truth, Stalin knew about the new weapon from information provided by Soviet spies working inside the Manhattan Project.

On July 26th, Truman, Churchill and President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-Shek issued the Potsdam Declaration, a statement which called for the surrender of Japan. It was an ultimatum; as the Declaration stated, the alternative for Japan was “prompt and utter destruction.” The Declaration was transmitted via radio, leaflets were dropped over the home islands, and it was conveyed diplomatically by Swiss intermediaries. Newspapers in Japan were the first to announce that the government rejected the Declaration, although it is doubtful they had any official word on which to rely. On July 28th, Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki announced that since the Declaration was just a rehash of earlier Allied demands, it would be met with mokusatsu, a Japanese word that roughly translates as “to treat with silent contempt.” Thus, the Declaration was not so much rejected as it was ignored.

Much has been made of the Premier's words by historians, with some suggesting that his failure to issue an outright rejection indicated a willingness to negotiate. However, there is no strong evidence to support this. The faction in Tokyo that was willing to negotiate an end to the war wanted to deal from a position of strength. Even the Emperor, portrayed for more than seven decades as a man who wanted nothing more than peace, believed that strong resistance to an Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands would open the door for more balanced negotiations.

Even the Emperor, subject to deification by the Japanese population, could not see the events unfolding across the Pacific. When news reached Washington that Tokyo was unwilling to surrender, President Truman took the decision to use one or more nuclear weapons against Japanese cities. On August 6th, 1945, the weapon known as Little Boy was detonated over the city of Hiroshima. On August 9th, the weapon called Fat Man was used against Nagasaki. The immediate effects of the blast and short-term intense radiation exposure killed more than a quarter-million people over the next four months. The plan called for the continued use of nuclear weapons against one city after another until the Japanese surrendered. However, on August 15th, the Japanese government announced its surrender. Three weeks later, on board the battleship USS Missouri, the instrument of surrender was signed by representatives of the Japanese government and the Allied powers. The most destructive war in the history of mankind was over.

But what if the two atomic bombs had not been used? What if technical difficulties had delayed the production of a working nuclear weapon for several more years? Or, what if President Truman had come to consider nuclear weapons morally reprehensible and forbade their use against any target? While the latter scenario is unlikely (Truman said repeatedly that he did not hesitate in his decision to use the bombs against Japanese targets nor did he regret it later), the former could very well have taken place.

For the millions of Americans and their allies in uniform in 1945, an invasion of Japan seemed the next logical step in a bid to bring the Second World War to an end. What few of them knew, and what many people still do not know today, is that planning for the invasion of Japan was well underway. In fact, the primary plan for the invasion had been circulated in early May, 1945. It took into account the fanatical resistance the Japanese military had put up in the face of invasion of even the smallest bit of land in the Pacific. It was this plan which President Truman and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had in their minds as they discussed the use of nuclear weapons. As you will see, there were no easy alternatives.

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What Price Victory, August 6, 1945 (Part 1) |代价|||部分 What|||month|Section Welchen Preis hat der Sieg, 6. August 1945 (Teil 1) What Price Victory, August 6, 1945 (Part 1) El precio de la victoria, 6 de agosto de 1945 (1ª parte) Quel est le prix de la victoire, 6 août 1945 (1ère partie) 1945年8月6日「勝利の代償」(前編) Jaka jest cena zwycięstwa, 6 sierpnia 1945 r. (część 1) Qual o preço da vitória, 6 de agosto de 1945 (Parte 1) Какова цена победы, 6 августа 1945 г. (часть 1) Zaferin Bedeli, 6 Ağustos 1945 (Bölüm 1) Якою ціною здобута перемога, 6 серпня 1945 року (частина 1) 胜利的代价是什么,1945 年 8 月 6 日(第 1 部分)

Every outcome in history has at least one alternative, that path that was not followed. |результат||||||||||||| All|outcome||history|||at least||alternative||path||||taken |risultato||||||||||||| Every outcome in history has at least one alternative, that path that was not followed. 历史上的每一个结果都至少有一个选择,即未遵循的路径。 If you've listened to this podcast for a couple of years or more, you have heard a similar version of tonight's episode. ||||||||||||||||||||сегодняшнего эпизода| |you have||||podcast||||||||||||||||show 如果您已经听过这个播客几年或更长时间,那么您一定听过今晚这一集的类似版本。 This is one of the few times that, instead of exploring just the event as it occurred, we also take a look at the other likely path. ||||||||||exploring|||||||||||||||| |||||рідкісних||||||||||||||||||||| 这是为数不多的几次,我们不只探索事件发生时的情况,还考虑了其他可能的路径。 Why? 为什么? Because that other branch of the tree of history was the one that most of the world thought would be the one to play out. ||||||||||||||||pasaulis|||||||| |||ramo||||||||||||||pensava||||||| Çünkü tarih ağacının diğer dalı, dünyanın büyük bir kısmının sonunun geleceğini düşündüğü daldı. 因为历史之树的另一个分支是世界上大多数人认为会发挥作用的分支。 The path that was not chosen was also well-planned for by the groups involved because almost all the decision-makers were kept in the dark about one huge fact. |||||||||||||||||||tomadores de decisão||||no conhecimento|o||||| Seçilmeyen yol da ilgili gruplar tarafından iyi planlanmıştı çünkü neredeyse tüm karar vericiler büyük bir gerçek hakkında karanlıkta bırakılmıştı. 没有选择的道路也是相关团体精心策划的,因为几乎所有的决策者都对一个巨大的事实一无所知。 This is amazingly rare in modern history. 这在近代史上极为罕见。

On August 6, 1945, a United States Army Air Corps B-29 bomber named 'Enola Gay' dropped a uranium fission bomb codenamed “Little Boy” over the city of Hiroshima, Japan. |||||||||бомбардировщик||Энола||||ураниевую|деление|бомба|с кодовым названием|||||||Хиросима| |||||||||Bomber||Enola|||||||mit dem Codenamen|||||||| ||||||||bomber|||||||nuclear fuel||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||fissão|||||||||| |||||||||bombardero||Enola|||||||codenombrada|||||||| 1945 年 8 月 6 日,一架名为“Enola Gay”的美国陆军航空兵 B-29 轰炸机在日本广岛市上空投下了一枚代号为“小男孩”的铀裂变炸弹。 On August 9, a B-29 named 'Bock's Car' dropped a bomb with a plutonium core named “Fat Man” on Nagasaki. |||||Бок|||||||плутоний|||||| |||||Bock's|||||||Plutonium|||||| |||||Bock's|Bock's Car||||||plutonium core|||||| |||||Bock|||||||plutonio|||||| 8 月 9 日,一架名为“博克的汽车”的 B-29 在长崎投下了一枚名为“胖子”的钚核炸弹。 These two dates remain the only times nuclear weapons have been used for their original intended purpose: to destroy population centers along with an enemy's ability and desire to wage war. ||||||||||||||||||||||||Feindes|||||| |||||||||||||||intencionado||||||||||||||| Ces deux dates restent les seules fois où les armes nucléaires ont été utilisées pour leur objectif initial: détruire des centres de population ainsi que la capacité et le désir de l'ennemi de faire la guerre. Bu iki tarih, nükleer silahların asıl amaçları doğrultusunda kullanıldıkları tek tarih olarak kalmıştır: nüfus merkezleriyle birlikte düşmanın savaşma kabiliyetini ve arzusunu da yok etmek. 这两个日期仍然是核武器被用于其最初预期目的的唯一一次:摧毁人口中心以及敌人发动战争的能力和愿望。 For seven decades, the world has debated the wisdom and morality of the use of these weapons. ||||||||Weisheit|||||||| Yetmiş yıldır dünya bu silahların kullanımının bilgeliğini ve ahlakiliğini tartışıyor. 七十年来,世界一直在争论使用这些武器的智慧和道德。 To better understand the reasoning at work in the minds of Allied leaders and war planners, it is important to look at the events leading up to these August, 1945, dates and consider one of the greatest ‘what if' scenarios of not just the Second World War, but of all modern military history. |||||||||||||||les planificateurs|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||hypothetical situations||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||história militar moderna|| |||||||||||||||planificadores|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| Müttefik liderlerin ve savaş planlamacılarının zihinlerindeki mantığı daha iyi anlamak için, 1945 Ağustos'una kadar yaşanan olaylara bakmak ve sadece İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın değil, tüm modern askeri tarihin en büyük 'ya olursa' senaryolarından birini ele almak önemlidir. 为了更好地理解盟军领导人和战争策划者头脑中的推理,重要的是要查看导致 1945 年 8 月这些日期的事件,并考虑不仅仅是第二次世界大战的最伟大的“假设”场景之一世界大战,但所有现代军事史。 By the summer of 1945, the Empire of Japan had ceased being a threat in most areas of the Pacific theater of war. ||||||||||||uma ameaça|||||||teatro de guerra|| 1945 yazına gelindiğinde, Japonya İmparatorluğu Pasifik savaş alanının pek çok bölgesinde bir tehdit olmaktan çıkmıştı. 到 1945 年夏天,日本帝国已不再是太平洋战区大部分地区的威胁。 Okinawa, only 340 miles from mainland Japan, was secured by U.S. Окинава|||||||завоевана||| Okinawa|||||||||| Okinawa Island|||||||||| Okinawa||||Japón|||||| Okinawa|||||||tomada pelos EUA||| 距日本大陆仅 340 英里的冲绳被美国占领 Army and Marine Corps divisions by the end of June. ||||дивизии||||| ||Corpo de Fuzileiros||divisões||||| Ordu ve Deniz Piyadeleri tümenleri Haziran sonuna kadar. 陆军和海军陆战队师到六月底。 While significant Japanese ground forces remained active in China and Korea, the Allies had destroyed the Imperial Navy over the course of the previous three-and-a-half years, leaving her coastal cities open to shelling from the battleships and heavy cruisers of the U.S. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||обстрелу|||боевых кораблей|||тяжелые крейсеры|||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||heavy cruisers|||| |||||permaneceram ativas|||||||||destruído||Marinha Imperial|||||||últimos três anos||||||deixando abertas||cidades costeiras||||bombardeio naval|||navios de guerra|||cruzadores pesados|||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||beschuss|||Schlachtschiffe|||Kreuzer|||| ||||||||||Korea|||||||Haditengerészet|||||||||||||||||||||hadihajók|||a cirkálókat|||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||bombardeo|||baterías|||cruceros|||| Çin ve Kore'de önemli Japon kara kuvvetleri varlığını sürdürürken, Müttefikler önceki üç buçuk yıl boyunca İmparatorluk Donanmasını yok etmiş ve kıyı şehirlerini ABD'nin savaş gemileri ve ağır kruvazörlerinin bombardımanına açık bırakmıştı. 虽然大量的日本地面部队仍在中国和朝鲜活跃,但盟军在过去三年半的时间里摧毁了帝国海军,使她的沿海城市容易受到美国战列舰和重型巡洋舰的炮击 and British Pacific fleets. |||флоты |||Flotten |||flotas |||frotas ||Csendes-|flották 和英国太平洋舰队。 The Japanese air force, while numerically still a presence, was all but grounded due to a lack of fuel. |||||численно||||||||||||| ||||||||||||am Boden|||||| |||||numéricamente|||||||inutilizada|||||| |||||numericamente uma|||presença numérica||||praticamente imobilizada||||falta de|de combustível|combustível aéreo |||||számosságát tekintve|||||||földön maradt|||||| 日本空军虽然在数量上仍然存在,但由于缺乏燃料而几乎停飞。 Every major city in the Japanese home islands had been at least partially leveled by daily U.S. |||||||||||||разрушена|||| |||||||||||||ebnet|||| |||||||||||||nivelada|||| |grande|||||||||||parcialmente|destruída||diariamente|| Japon ana adalarındaki her büyük şehir günlük ABD saldırılarıyla en azından kısmen yerle bir edilmişti. 日本本土岛屿的每个主要城市都至少部分被美国每天夷为平地 Army Air Corps bombing raids. |||бомбардировочные| ||||bombardeos ||||ataques aéreas Ordu Hava Kuvvetleri bombardıman saldırıları. 陆军航空兵轰炸袭击。 The Japanese merchant fleet, once one of the world's largest, had ceased to exist. ||mercante|||||||||deixou de||deixar de existir Bir zamanlar dünyanın en büyüklerinden biri olan Japon ticaret filosunun varlığı sona ermişti. 曾经是世界上最大的商船队之一的日本商船队已经不复存在。 The island nation was cut off. |nação insular|||| Островное государство было отрезано. Ada ülkesinin bağlantısı kesildi. 这个岛国被切断了。

Yet, the remains of the once-vast empire fought on. Yine de, bir zamanların büyük imparatorluğunun kalıntıları savaşmaya devam etti. 然而,这个曾经庞大的帝国的遗迹仍在继续战斗。 There was a strong belief among the military leaders of Japan that a successful invasion of the four main Japanese home islands would mean the end of the nation as a distinct cultural entity. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||культурная сущность |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||cultural identity |||||||||||||bem-sucedida|||||principais|||||||||||||entidade cultural distinta||entidade cultural Japonya'nın askeri liderleri arasında, dört ana Japon adasının başarılı bir şekilde işgal edilmesinin, ulusun ayrı bir kültürel varlık olarak sonu anlamına geleceğine dair güçlü bir inanç vardı. 日本军事领导人坚信,成功入侵日本的四个主要本土岛屿将意味着这个国家作为一个独特的文化实体的终结。 The hardliners believed that surrender was not an option and that an Allied invasion required the entire population to fight to the point of extinction. |ястребы|||||||||||||||||||||||истребление |Hardliner||||||||||||||||||||||| |los intransigentes||||||||||||||||||||||| |os extremistas|||||||uma opção||||||||||||||||extinção total Сторонники жесткой линии считали, что капитуляция невозможна и что вторжение союзников требует, чтобы все население сражалось на грани исчезновения. Sertlik yanlıları teslim olmanın bir seçenek olmadığına ve bir Müttefik işgalinin tüm nüfusun yok olma noktasına gelene kadar savaşmasını gerektirdiğine inanıyordu. 强硬派认为投降不是一种选择,盟军的入侵需要全体人民战斗到灭绝的地步。 There were voices of moderation in Tokyo, one of them being the Emperor of Japan. ||||умеренности|||||||||| ||||reasonableness|||||||||| ||vozes||moderação|||||||||| Tokyo'da ılımlı sesler vardı, bunlardan biri de Japonya İmparatoru'ydu. 东京有温和的声音,其中之一就是日本天皇。 However, tradition demanded that he remain officially silent. ||требовала||||| ||exigia||||| Ancak, gelenekler onun resmi olarak sessiz kalmasını gerektiriyordu. 然而,传统要求他保持正式的沉默。 He had made his desire for a negotiated peace clear, however, in private discussions with his ministers. |||||||переговорного||||||||| |||||||settled||||||||| |||||||negociada|||||em conversas privadas|discussões privadas|||ministros Ancak bakanlarıyla yaptığı özel görüşmelerde müzakere edilmiş bir barış arzusunu açıkça ortaya koymuştu. 然而,在与部长们的私下讨论中,他明确表示希望通过谈判达成和平。 The Emperor wanted the Soviet Union (who was not yet at war with Japan) to act as a mediator between the warring powers in the Pacific. ||||||||||||||||||Vermittler|||kriegsführenden|||| ||||||||||||||||||negotiator||||||| ||||||||||||||||||mediador|||beligerantes|||| ||||||||||||||||||mediador|||as partes em guerra|||| L'empereur voulait que l'Union soviétique (qui n'était pas encore en guerre avec le Japon) agisse comme médiateur entre les puissances en guerre dans le Pacifique. 天皇希望苏联(尚未与日本交战)充当太平洋交战大国之间的调解人。 However, he also wanted some sort of concrete victory in order to gain leverage during the negotiations. |||||||конкретной|||||получить|||| |||||||||||||avantage||| |||||||||||||advantage||| |||||||||||||ventaja||| |||||||vitória concreta|||||obter|vantagem estratégica||| Cependant, il souhaitait également une sorte de victoire concrète afin de gagner en influence pendant les négociations. Bununla birlikte, müzakereler sırasında koz elde etmek için bir tür somut zafer de istiyordu. 然而,他也希望取得某种具体的胜利,以便在谈判中获得影响力。 But by the end of June, 1945, it was clear there would be no great Japanese victory on Okinawa or anywhere else. |||||||||||||||||Okinawa||em nenhum lugar|senão 但到 1945 年 6 月底,日本人显然不会在冲绳或其他任何地方取得重大胜利。 Furthermore, the Soviets were not interested in brokering a deal of any sort: Josef Stalin had his own plans. |||||||intermediar||||||||||| |||||||vermitteln||||||||||| |||||||negotiating||||||||||| |||||興味を持って||仲介する||||||||||| Além disso|||||interessados em||intermediar uma||||||||||| Furthermore, the Soviets were not interested in brokering a deal of any sort: Josef Stalin had his own plans. Dahası, Sovyetler herhangi bir anlaşmaya aracılık etmekle ilgilenmiyordu: Josef Stalin'in kendi planları vardı. 此外,苏联人对促成任何形式的交易不感兴趣:约瑟夫斯大林有他自己的计划。

Meanwhile, the war in Europe ended in early May, 1945. entretanto|||||||| 与此同时,欧洲战争于 1945 年 5 月初结束。 While the occupation of Germany and Eastern Europe and post-war actions of the Allies had been discussed on multiple occasions since early in the conflict, there were still many details which needed to be sorted out. |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||ordenados| |||||||||pós-guerra||ações pós-guerra||||||||várias ocasiões|várias ocasiões|||||||||||||||esclarecidas| 尽管自冲突初期以来已多次讨论占领德国和东欧以及盟军的战后行动,但仍有许多细节需要解决。 Beginning on July 17th, leaders of the United States, United Kingdom and the Soviet Union met in Potsdam, Germany to discuss both the issues of occupation and the war in the Pacific. |||||||||||||||||Potsdam|||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||Potsdam Germany|||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||Potsdam|||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||Potsdam Alemanha|||discutir sobre||||||||||| 从 7 月 17 日开始,美国、英国和苏联领导人在德国波茨坦会晤,讨论占领和太平洋战争问题。 President Harry Truman, who had come to the office after the death of President Roosevelt in April, arrived at the conference with monumental but secret knowledge: an atomic bomb had been successfully tested in the New Mexico desert just one day before the beginning of the conference. ||Harry Truman|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||||cargo|||||||||chegou|||||monumental||secreta|conhecimento monumental|||||||testada|||||deserto de Nova México||||||||| 哈里·杜鲁门 (Harry Truman) 总统在罗斯福总统于 4 月去世后来到办公室,他带着具有里程碑意义但秘密的知识来到了会议现场:就在会议开始前一天,一颗原子弹在新墨西哥州的沙漠中成功地进行了试验. Three years of super-secret work and billions of dollars had resulted in the construction of the most deadly weapon in human history. |||supersecreta||||bilhões||dólares|||||construção||||mortal|||| Üç yıl süren çok gizli çalışmalar ve milyarlarca dolar, insanlık tarihinin en ölümcül silahının yapımıyla sonuçlanmıştı. 三年的超级秘密工作和数十亿美元造就了人类历史上最致命的武器。 Yet only a handful of people not working directly on the device knew that it even existed. ||||из|||||||||||| ||||||||||||||||existia |||csak egy maroknyi||||||||||||| Yine de doğrudan cihaz üzerinde çalışmayan sadece bir avuç insan cihazın varlığından haberdardı. 然而,只有少数不直接使用该设备的人知道它的存在。 Truman himself was not made aware of the bomb's pending completion until after Roosevelt's death in April, 1945, despite the fact he had been the Vice-President. ||||||||||achèvement imminent||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||Roosevelt's|||||||||||| |||||informado|||bomba|iminente|conclusão da bomba|||||||apesar de|||||||| ||||||||Bombe|bevorstehenden|||||||||||||||| Truman||||||||bombája|||||Roosevelt|||||||||||| ||||||||bomba|pendiente||||Roosevelt|||||||||||| Truman'ın kendisi, Başkan Yardımcısı olmasına rağmen, Roosevelt'in Nisan 1945'teki ölümüne kadar bombanın tamamlanmak üzere olduğundan haberdar edilmemiştir. 直到 1945 年 4 月罗斯福去世后,杜鲁门本人才知道炸弹即将完成,尽管他曾担任副总统。 Truman met with Prime Minister Winston Churchill on July 21st, at which time the two agreed on the use of the weapon. Truman 21 Temmuz'da Başbakan Winston Churchill ile bir araya geldi ve bu görüşmede ikili silahın kullanılması konusunda anlaştı. 杜鲁门于 7 月 21 日会见了英国首相温斯顿丘吉尔,当时两人同意使用这种武器。 Soviet Premier Stalin was not told until July 25th, a delay which made him privately angry but only because his advice on the weapon's use was not sought as Churchill's had been. |||||||||||||||||||||||Waffen||||||Churchills|| |||||||||||||||||||||||arma|||||||| ||||||||||atraso de||||privadamente|irritado em privado|||||opinião sobre|||uso da arma||||consultada|||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||запитували|||| Sovyet Başbakanı Stalin'e 25 Temmuz'a kadar haber verilmedi; bu gecikme onu özel olarak kızdırdı ama bunun tek nedeni Churchill'in yaptığı gibi silahın kullanımına ilişkin tavsiyesinin alınmamış olmasıydı. 苏联总理斯大林直到 7 月 25 日才被告知,这一延迟让他私下感到愤怒,但这只是因为没有像丘吉尔那样征求他对武器使用的建议。 In truth, Stalin knew about the new weapon from information provided by Soviet spies working inside the Manhattan Project. |||||||||||||||||Manhattan Project|Manhattan Project ||||||||||fornecida pelos|||os espiões||||Projeto Manhattan| 事实上,斯大林是从在曼哈顿计划中工作的苏联间谍提供的信息中了解到这种新武器的。

On July 26th, Truman, Churchill and President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-Shek issued the Potsdam Declaration, a statement which called for the surrender of Japan. ||||||||||||Chiang|Kai|Shek||||Deklaration||||||||| ||||||||||||Kai-Shek|Shek|Kai-Shek||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||emitiram|||||declaração de Potsdam||||||| |||||||||||||Kai|Shek|emitieron|||||||||||| 26 Temmuz'da Truman, Churchill ve Çin Cumhuriyeti Cumhurbaşkanı Chiang Kai-Shek, Japonya'nın teslim olması çağrısında bulunan Potsdam Deklarasyonu'nu yayınladılar. 7月26日,杜鲁门、丘吉尔和中华民国总统蒋介石发表《波茨坦公告》,要求日本投降。 It was an ultimatum; as the Declaration stated, the alternative for Japan was “prompt and utter destruction.” The Declaration was transmitted via radio, leaflets were dropped over the home islands, and it was conveyed diplomatically by Swiss intermediaries. |||||||||||||мгновенное уничтож||полное|||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||des tracts|||||||||||||| |||final demand||||||||||||||||||||pamphlets||||||||||||||representatives |||ultimato||||afirmou||opção||||rápida||total destruição|destruição total|||||por meio de||panfletos||foram lançados||||||||transmitida|de forma diplomática||intermediários suíços|intermediários suíços |||Ultimatum|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||Schweizer|Vermittler |||||||||||||||totale|||||||||||||||||||||| |||ультиматум|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||inmediata||||||||||panfletos|||||||||||diplomáticamente|||intermediarios Bu bir ültimatomdu; Deklarasyonda da belirtildiği gibi Japonya için alternatif "derhal ve tamamen yok edilmekti". Deklarasyon radyo aracılığıyla iletildi, ana adalara broşürler atıldı ve İsviçreli aracılar tarafından diplomatik olarak iletildi. 这是最后通牒。正如宣言所言,日本的替代选择是“迅速而彻底的毁灭”。该宣言通过无线电传播,传单散落在本国岛屿上,并由瑞士中间人以外交方式传达。 Newspapers in Japan were the first to announce that the government rejected the Declaration, although it is doubtful they had any official word on which to rely. |||||||||||||||||||||offiziellen||||| |||||||anunciaram||||||||||duvidoso||||palavra oficial|||||se apoiar Hükümetin Deklarasyonu reddettiğini ilk duyuran Japonya'daki gazeteler olmuştur, ancak bu konuda resmi bir açıklama yapıldığından kuşku duyulmaktadır. 日本的报纸最先宣布政府拒绝了该宣言,尽管他们是否有任何官方说法值得怀疑。 On July 28th, Japanese Premier Kantaro Suzuki announced that since the Declaration was just a rehash of earlier Allied demands, it would be met with mokusatsu, a Japanese word that roughly translates as “to treat with silent contempt.” Thus, the Declaration was not so much rejected as it was ignored. ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||как||||||||||||||||| |||||||||||||||reprise|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| |||||Suzuki|Kantaro Suzuki|||||||||repetition||||||||||silent contempt|||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||||Suzuki|||||||apenas||repetição das demandas||||||||||desdém silencioso|||||aproximadamente|traduz-se|||tratar com desprezo||silêncio desdenhoso|desdém silencioso||||||||rejeitada (1)||||desconsiderada |||||Kantaro||||||||||Wiederholung||||||||||mokusatsu|||||||||||||||||||||||| ||||miniszter|Kantaro|Suzuki|||||nyilatkozat|||||||szövetséges|||||||mokusatsu||||||||||||megvetés|||nyilatkozat||||||||| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||зневага|||||||||||| |||||Kantaro||||||||||repetición||||||||||mokusatsu|||||||||||||||||||||||| Le 28 juillet, le Premier ministre japonais Kantaro Suzuki a annoncé que, puisque la Déclaration n'était qu'une répétition des demandes antérieures des Alliés, elle serait accueillie par mokusatsu, un mot japonais qui se traduit à peu près par «traiter avec un mépris silencieux». Ainsi, la Déclaration n’a pas été tant rejetée qu’elle a été ignorée. 28 Temmuz'da Japonya Başbakanı Kantaro Suzuki, Deklarasyonun daha önceki Müttefik taleplerinin bir tekrarı olması nedeniyle, kabaca "sessiz bir küçümseme" anlamına gelen Japonca bir kelime olan mokusatsu ile karşılanacağını duyurdu. Böylece Deklarasyon reddedilmekten ziyade görmezden gelinmiş oldu. 7 月 28 日,日本首相铃木贯太郎宣布,由于该宣言只是盟军早先要求的翻版,因此将面临 mokusatsu,日语大致翻译为“以沉默的蔑视对待”。因此,宣言与其说是被拒绝,不如说是被忽视了。

Much has been made of the Premier's words by historians, with some suggesting that his failure to issue an outright rejection indicated a willingness to negotiate. ||||||Premier|||||||||||||offene|||||| ||||||Primer||||||||||||||||||| ||||||do Primeiro Ministro||||||sugerindo|||fracasso||fazer uma declaração||rejeição clara|rejeição clara|||disposição|| |||||||||||||||||||пряму|||||| Les historiens ont beaucoup parlé des propos du premier ministre, certains suggérant que son incapacité à rejeter carrément indiquait une volonté de négocier. Başbakan'ın sözleri tarihçiler tarafından çok tartışıldı ve bazıları Başbakan'ın kesin bir ret kararı vermemesinin müzakere isteğine işaret ettiğini öne sürdü. 历史学家对总理的言论做了很多评论,一些人认为他没有直接拒绝表明他愿意谈判。 However, there is no strong evidence to support this. 但是,没有强有力的证据支持这一点。 The faction in Tokyo that was willing to negotiate an end to the war wanted to deal from a position of strength. |Fraktion|||||||||||||||||||| |group|||||||||||||||||||| |facción|||||||||||||||||||| |fação|||||disposta a||||||||||negociar||||| Tokyo'da savaşı sona erdirmek için müzakere etmeye istekli olan grup, güçlü bir pozisyondan anlaşma yapmak istiyordu. 东京愿意通过谈判结束战争的派系希望从强势地位出发。 Even the Emperor, portrayed for more than seven decades as a man who wanted nothing more than peace, believed that strong resistance to an Allied invasion of the Japanese home islands would open the door for more balanced negotiations. |||retratado||||sete décadas|||||||||||||||||||||||||abriria||a porta|||mais equilibradas|negociações equilibradas Yetmiş yıldan fazla bir süredir barıştan başka bir şey istemeyen bir adam olarak tasvir edilen İmparator bile, Müttefiklerin Japon ana adalarını işgaline karşı güçlü bir direnişin daha dengeli müzakerelere kapı açacağına inanıyordu. 即使是七十年来被描绘成一个只想和平的人的天皇也相信,对盟军入侵日本本土岛屿的强烈抵抗将为更平衡的谈判打开大门。

Even the Emperor, subject to deification by the Japanese population, could not see the events unfolding across the Pacific. |||||обожествление||||||||||||| |||||worship as divine||||||||||||| ||Imperador|||deificação||||||||||desdobrando-se||| |||||Vergöttlichung||||||||||||| навіть|||||||||||||||||| |||||deificación||||||||||desarrollándose||| Japon halkı tarafından tanrılaştırılan İmparator bile Pasifik'te gelişen olayları göremedi. 即使是被日本人神化的天皇,也看不到太平洋彼岸正在发生的事件。 When news reached Washington that Tokyo was unwilling to surrender, President Truman took the decision to use one or more nuclear weapons against Japanese cities. |||||||relutante em||||||||||||||||| When news reached Washington that Tokyo was unwilling to surrender, President Truman took the decision to use one or more nuclear weapons against Japanese cities. 当东京不愿投降的消息传到华盛顿时,杜鲁门总统决定对日本城市使用一种或多种核武器。 On August 6th, 1945, the weapon known as Little Boy was detonated over the city of Hiroshima. ||||||||||detoniert||||| |||||||Pequeno|Menino|foi|foi detonada||||| 6 Ağustos 1945'te Little Boy olarak bilinen silah Hiroşima şehri üzerinde patlatıldı. 1945 年 8 月 6 日,被称为小男孩的武器在广岛市上空引爆。 On August 9th, the weapon called Fat Man was used against Nagasaki. |||||||||||the city |de agosto|||||Gorda||||| ||||||Fat|||||Nagaszaki 8月9日,名为胖子的武器被用于对付长崎。 The immediate effects of the blast and short-term intense radiation exposure killed more than a quarter-million people over the next four months. |imediatos||||||||intensa|radiação intensa||||||||||||| ||||||||||sugárzás||||||||||||| Patlamanın ani etkileri ve kısa süreli yoğun radyasyona maruz kalma, sonraki dört ay boyunca çeyrek milyondan fazla insanın ölümüne neden oldu. 在接下来的四个月里,爆炸的直接影响和短期强烈的辐射暴露导致超过 25 万人丧生。 The plan called for the continued use of nuclear weapons against one city after another until the Japanese surrendered. ||||||||||||uma cidade||||||se renderam ||||||||nukleáris|||||||||| Plan, Japonlar teslim olana kadar nükleer silahların birbiri ardına şehirlere karşı kullanılmaya devam edilmesini öngörüyordu. 该计划要求继续对一个又一个城市使用核武器,直到日本投降。 However, on August 15th, the Japanese government announced its surrender. ||agosto|||||anunciou|| |||||||||kapitulációját 然而,8月15日,日本政府宣布投降。 Three weeks later, on board the battleship USS Missouri, the instrument of surrender was signed by representatives of the Japanese government and the Allied powers. ||||||acorazado|||||||||||||||||| |três semanas|||||||||instrumento de rendição||||assinada|||||||||| |||||||USS|Missouri||||kapituláció|||||||||||Szövetséges| Üç hafta sonra, USS Missouri zırhlısında, Japon hükümeti ve Müttefik güçlerin temsilcileri tarafından teslimiyet belgesi imzalandı. 三周后,在密苏里号战列舰上,日本政府和协约国代表签署了投降书。 The most destructive war in the history of mankind was over. ||||||||l'humanité|| ||devastating|||||||| ||destrutiva||||||a humanidade|| İnsanlık tarihinin en yıkıcı savaşı sona ermişti. 人类历史上最具破坏性的战争结束了。

But what if the two atomic bombs had not been used? |||||nuclear||||| |||||atômicas||||| ||||||bombák|||| 但是,如果没有使用两颗原子弹呢? What if technical difficulties had delayed the production of a working nuclear weapon for several more years? ||técnicas|dificuldades técnicas||atrasado|||||||arma nuclear|||| Ya teknik zorluklar çalışan bir nükleer silahın üretimini birkaç yıl daha geciktirseydi? 如果技术困难将有效核武器的生产推迟了几年怎么办? Or, what if President Truman had come to consider nuclear weapons morally reprehensible and forbade their use against any target? ||||||||||||осуждаемыми||||||| ||||||||||||||interdisait||||| ||||||||||||morally unacceptable||prohibited||||| |||||||||||moralmente reprováveis|moralmente reprováveis||proibisse o uso||||| ||||||||||||verwerflich||||||| ||||Truman|||||||morálisan|||megtiltotta||||| ||||||||||||осудними||заборонив||||| Ya da Başkan Truman nükleer silahların ahlaki açıdan kınanması gerektiğini düşünseydi ve herhangi bir hedefe karşı kullanılmasını yasaklasaydı ne olurdu? 或者,如果杜鲁门总统开始认为核武器在道义上应受谴责并禁止对任何目标使用核武器怎么办? While the latter scenario is unlikely (Truman said repeatedly that he did not hesitate in his decision to use the bombs against Japanese targets nor did he regret it later), the former could very well have taken place. |||situation|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||| ||este último|cenário (1)|||||repetidamente|||||hesitou||||||||||alvos japoneses||||lamentou isso|||||||||| ||utóbbi||||Truman||||||||||||||bombák|||célpontok||||megbánta|||||||||| İkinci senaryo pek olası olmasa da (Truman defalarca bombaları Japon hedeflerine karşı kullanma kararında tereddüt etmediğini ve daha sonra pişmanlık duymadığını söylemiştir), ilki pekala gerçekleşmiş olabilir. 虽然后一种情况不太可能发生(杜鲁门一再表示,他在决定对日本目标使用炸弹时毫不犹豫,后来也没有后悔),但前者很可能发生了。

For the millions of Americans and their allies in uniform in 1945, an invasion of Japan seemed the next logical step in a bid to bring the Second World War to an end. ||milhões|||||||em serviço|||||||||lógica|passo lógico|||tentativa||dar fim||||||| 1945'te üniformalı milyonlarca Amerikalı ve müttefikleri için Japonya'nın işgali, İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nı sona erdirmek için atılacak bir sonraki mantıklı adım gibi görünüyordu. 对于 1945 年的数百万身穿制服的美国人和他们的盟友来说,入侵日本似乎是结束第二次世界大战的下一个合乎逻辑的步骤。 What few of them knew, and what many people still do not know today, is that planning for the invasion of Japan was well underway. ||||||||||||||||||||||||en marcha ||||||||||||||||o planejamento||||||||em andamento ||||||||||||||||||||||||в процесі Çok azının bildiği ve bugün hala pek çok insanın bilmediği şey, Japonya'nın işgali için planlamaların çoktan başlamış olduğuydu. 他们中很少有人知道,而今天许多人仍然不知道的是,入侵日本的计划正在顺利进行。 In fact, the primary plan for the invasion had been circulated in early May, 1945. ||||||||||circulado||| |||plano principal|||||||divulgado||| |||elsődleges|||||||terjesztették||| Aslında işgalin ana planı Mayıs 1945'in başlarında dolaşıma sokulmuştu. 事实上,入侵的主要计划已于 1945 年 5 月上旬传阅。 It took into account the fanatical resistance the Japanese military had put up in the face of invasion of even the smallest bit of land in the Pacific. |||||fanatische|||||||||||||||||||||| |||||extreme|||||||||||||||||||||| |||||fanática|||||||||||||||||||||| ||em consideração|consideração||fanática||||||||||diante de||||||o menor|||||| |||||||||||||||||||||legkisebb||||||Csendes-óceán Japon ordusunun Pasifik'teki en küçük bir toprak parçasının bile işgali karşısında gösterdiği fanatik direnişi dikkate almıştır. 它考虑到了日本军方面对太平洋上哪怕是最小的一块土地的入侵所进行的狂热抵抗。 It was this plan which President Truman and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had in their minds as they discussed the use of nuclear weapons. ||||||||||||||||||discutiram sobre|||||armas nucleares ||||||Truman||||Winston|Churchill|||||||tárgyaltak||||| Başkan Truman ve Başbakan Winston Churchill nükleer silahların kullanımını tartışırken akıllarında bu plan vardı. 杜鲁门总统和温斯顿丘吉尔首相在讨论使用核武器时想到的就是这个计划。 As you will see, there were no easy alternatives. |you will||||||| ||||||||opções fáceis 正如您将看到的,没有简单的选择。