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The Fraser Institute, Essential UCLA School of Economics: The Economics of Unintended Consequences

Essential UCLA School of Economics: The Economics of Unintended Consequences

Welcome to the essential ideas of the UCLA School of Economics.

Many people assume that regulations designed to achieve a specific result

—say increased safety—will actually achieve that intended outcome.

But economist Sam Peltzman, a key member of the UCLA School of economics,

thought that because human behaviour is so complex,

regulators cannot anticipate all the consequences of their regulations,

and therefore regulations might not achieve their intended results.

They may even achieve the exact opposite. Let's explore this idea using the example of

safety regulations for cars from Peltzman's own research.

In the mid-to-late 1960s, the United States federal government wanted to reduce traffic

fatalities and serious injuries from car accidents.

So the government mandated a number of safety features, including seat belts for all

occupants, padded dashboards, dual braking system, and energy-absorbing steering

columns. But - following the introduction of the new safety regulations,

traffic fatalities didn't fall.

What Peltzman discovered was that after these regulations were introduced, deaths of

people in cars fell, but deaths of pedestrians and motorcycle drivers actually increased.

That's because the new safety regulations made accidents less dangerous to drivers,

and so the result was that drivers drove more intensely.

For example, they drove faster, and followed more closely behind cars in front of them,

which reduced safety for pedestrians and motorcycles. And so the regulations that

increased the safety of drivers had the unintended consequence of increasing traffic

deaths for pedestrians and motorcyclists.

Peltzman's idea that making things safer causes people to take more risks has become

so well-known that many economists now refer to this kind of offsetting behaviour as

“The Peltzman Effect.” It should provide caution to bureaucrats and politicians who

believe that problems can be easily solved by imposing regulations.

For more information on the UCLA economics visit EssentialUCLAeconomics.org, and to learn about

more essential scholars, visit EssentialScholars.org

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Essential UCLA School of Economics: The Economics of Unintended Consequences ||||||||niezamierzonych| ||||||||意図しない| ||Escola||||||| Wesentliche UCLA School of Economics: Die Ökonomie der unbeabsichtigten Folgen Lo esencial de la Facultad de Economía de la UCLA: La economía de las consecuencias imprevistas Podstawy ekonomii UCLA School of Economics: Ekonomia niezamierzonych konsekwencji Essencial da Escola de Economia da UCLA: A economia das consequências imprevistas Школа экономики Калифорнийского университета: Экономика непреднамеренных последствий Temel UCLA Ekonomi Okulu: İstenmeyen Sonuçların Ekonomisi Essential UCLA School of Economics: Економіка непередбачуваних наслідків 加州大学洛杉矶分校经济学院必修课:意外后果经济学

Welcome to the essential ideas  of the UCLA School of Economics. UCLA Ekonomi Okulu'nun temel fikirlerine hoş geldiniz.

Many people assume that regulations  designed to achieve a specific result Muitas pessoas partem do princípio de que os regulamentos concebidos para alcançar um resultado específico Birçok kişi, düzenlemelerin belirli bir sonuca ulaşmak için tasarlandığını varsayar. Багато хто вважає, що нормативно-правові акти, розроблені для досягнення конкретного результату

—say increased safety—will actually  achieve that intended outcome. ||safety|||||| |||||||zamierzony|wynik -digamos, o aumento da segurança- atingirá efectivamente o resultado pretendido. -скажімо, підвищеної безпеки - насправді досягне цього запланованого результату.

But economist Sam Peltzman, a key  member of the UCLA School of economics, |economist|||||participant||||||

thought that because human  behaviour is so complex,

regulators cannot anticipate all the consequences of their regulations, authorities|||||||| ||予測する|||||| ||przewidzieć|||||| ||predvideti|||||| as entidades reguladoras não podem prever todas as consequências dos seus regulamentos, регулятори не можуть передбачити всіх наслідків своїх нормативних актів,

and therefore regulations might not achieve their intended results. |||||||zamierzonych| а отже, регулювання може не досягти запланованих результатів.

They may even achieve the exact opposite.  Let's explore this idea using the example of ||||||przeciwieństwo||||||||

safety regulations for cars  from Peltzman's own research. |||||Peltzman (1)|| normas de segurança para os automóveis a partir da investigação do próprio Peltzman.

In the mid-to-late 1960s, the United States  federal government wanted to reduce traffic |||||||||national||||| ||中頃|||||||||||| ||połowie||||||||||||

fatalities and serious  injuries from car accidents. 死亡者||重傷|||| ofiary śmiertelne||||||wypadków samochodowych smrtnost||||||

So the government mandated a number of  safety features, including seat belts for all |||||||segurança|características||||| |||||||||||safety straps|| |||義務付けた|||||||||| |||nakazała||||||||pasy bezpieczeństwa|| Por isso, o governo impôs uma série de medidas de segurança, incluindo cintos de segurança para todos Тому уряд запровадив низку заходів безпеки, включаючи ремені безпеки для всіх

occupants, padded dashboards, dual braking  system, and energy-absorbing steering ||deski rozdzielcze|podwójny system|hamulcowy||||pochłaniający energię|układ kierowniczy 乗員|パッド付き||||||エネルギー|| |almofadados|painéis||de frenagem||||| potniki|oblazinjeni|armature|dvojni|zavorni||||| ocupantes, painéis de instrumentos almofadados, sistema de travagem duplo e direcção com absorção de energia м'які панелі приладів, подвійна гальмівна система та енергопоглинаюче рульове управління

columns. But - following the introduction  of the new safety regulations, kolumny(1)||||wprowadzeniu nowych||||| colunas. Mas - após a introdução das novas normas de segurança, колонки. Але - після введення нових правил безпеки,

traffic fatalities didn't fall.

What Peltzman discovered was that after  these regulations were introduced, deaths of ||||||||||zgony|

people in cars fell, but deaths of pedestrians  and motorcycle drivers actually increased. |||||||歩行者||||| |||spadli||||piesi||||| кількість загиблих в автомобілях зменшилася, але смертність пішоходів і водіїв мотоциклів навпаки зросла.

That's because the new safety regulations  made accidents less dangerous to drivers, |||||||||niebezpieczne||

and so the result was that  drivers drove more intensely. |||||||||激しく |||||||||intensywniej

For example, they drove faster, and followed  more closely behind cars in front of them, ||||||||bliżej||||||

which reduced safety for pedestrians and  motorcycles. And so the regulations that ||||||motocykle|||||

increased the safety of drivers had the  unintended consequence of increasing traffic ||||||||skutek|||

deaths for pedestrians and motorcyclists. ||||motocykliści

Peltzman's idea that making things safer  causes people to take more risks has become |||||||||||ryzykować|| A ideia de Peltzman de que tornar as coisas mais seguras leva as pessoas a correrem mais riscos tornou-se Ідея Пельцмана про те, що підвищення безпеки призводить до того, що люди йдуть на більший ризик, стала

so well-known that many economists now refer  to this kind of offsetting behaviour as ||||||||||||オフセット|| ||||||||||||wyrównawcze|| |||||||omenjajo|||||kompenzacijsko|| tão conhecido que muitos economistas se referem agora a este tipo de comportamento de compensação como настільки добре відома, що багато економістів тепер називають цей вид компенсаційної поведінки

“The Peltzman Effect.” It should provide  caution to bureaucrats and politicians who ||||||注意|||||誰が ||||||ostrożność||biurokratom||| ||||||opreznost||birokrati||| "O Efeito Peltzman". Deveria servir de alerta para os burocratas e políticos que "Ефект Пельцмана". Це має застерегти бюрократів і політиків, які

believe that problems can be easily  solved by imposing regulations. ||||||||wprowadzając|

For more information on the UCLA economics visit EssentialUCLAeconomics.org, and to learn about

more essential scholars, visit EssentialScholars.org