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Crash Course 2: Philosophy., 14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Conspiracy Theories & Epistemic Responsibility. Part 1/2.

14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Conspiracy Theories & Epistemic Responsibility. Part 1/2.

Crash Course Philosophy is brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace: share your passion with the world.

For generations, just about everybody in the United States got vaccinations. And I'm sure there will be no conversation about this in the comments. And as a result, diseases like measles were all but eradicated.

But in 1998, a study published in a scientific journal linked vaccines with autism. Even though that study was later discredited, ever since then, a small but vocal subset of parents have refused to vaccinate their kids.

Now, measles are back, as is whooping cough, mumps, and other diseases that were nearly wiped out. Children's lives are being endangered because some parents are acting on beliefs that have no scientific evidence to support them. So, why am I talking about this on Crash Course Philosophy? Normally, when we talk about responsibility, we're talking about things that you do. But in philosophy, we sometimes face other obligations. Some philosophers have argued that we all have epistemic responsibility – that is, responsibility we have regarding our beliefs.

Epistemic responsibility is an especially interesting area of philosophy because it's where many of its sub-disciplines overlap – where epistemology brushes up against philosophy of religion, which bumps into ethics. And philosophers might argue that we live in a world that could probably use a lot more epistemic responsibility – or at least, more people who understand what it is. Anti-vaxxers, climate change deniers, conspiracy theorists.

The world is full of people who hold beliefs without any evidence. And not only that, they – like most of us – encourage others to share their beliefs. But over the past 200 years or so, philosophers have developed some pretty compelling responses to this phenomenon.

A few thinkers have come up with useful ways of thinking about the beliefs we have, and the harm they can cause, and what responsibilities go along with having them. Meanwhile, others have argued that we can sometimes hold beliefs without any proof. Not about vaccines, or global warming, or the moon landing – but about God.

[Theme Music]

W.K. Clifford lived in England in the mid-1800s, where the only vaccine that existed was for smallpox, and even that earned its share of scorn and ridicule at the time. But Clifford, who was both a mathematician and a philosopher, would probably have some very strong opinions about today's anti-vaxxers. Because Clifford was one of the leading proponents of epistemic responsibility of his time. He most famously, and bluntly, put it this way: “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” And instead of using vaccinations as an example, Clifford told the story of a ship owner. He said, suppose there was a guy who owned a ship that he knew was old and decrepit and hadn't been inspected in a long time. That ship was scheduled to make a transatlantic voyage, and the owner worried that it might not make it. But, overhauling the ship would be pricey and time-consuming. In time, the owner talked himself into believing that the ship was seaworthy. The ship set sail. Then it sank. And hundreds of people drowned. But, the owner? He collected insurance money from his loss, and no one blamed him for the tragedy.

Now, most people would agree that the shipowner was responsible for the deaths of the ship's passengers. But Clifford went even further. He argued that the owner would have been guilty even if the ship managed to make the trip safely. Because: He was guilty of accepting a belief without sufficient evidence, and whether that actually leads to harm or not, he has still done wrong, epistemically and morally.

Now, you might argue, “Don't I have the right to believe whatever I want, as long as it doesn't hurt anyone?” Yeah, good question. Clifford argued that there's no such thing as a private belief. Because: We all talk about our beliefs – some of us do it a lot – and it causes our beliefs to spread. But even if you never vocalize a belief, it still influences the way you act and the way others perceive you.

So in this way, a belief can spread subtly, insidiously, without a word being spoken. Think about other kinds of beliefs that lack evidence, for example sexist beliefs. Imagine a modern day sexist in an American university. Most of these people are gonna know that actually expressing their sexist views isn't going to fly. But a sexist's beliefs, even if they're never overtly stated, tend to show through in the ways they interact with women and speak of them. So, no matter what: You know them and you know their views and you know their views subtly influence others, particularly if they're a person in position of authority or respect. Since our views always have the potential to harm others, W. K. Clifford argued that we have an epistemic responsibility only to believe things for which we have evidence. And if you don't have evidence, you're morally obligated to refrain from the belief. Basically, you should withhold judgment until you investigate the situation.

Let's head over to the Thought Bubble to explore this more with some Flash Philosophy. It's Tuesday, and your teacher tells you that, this week, there will be a pop quiz. And she's nice enough to even define for you what she means by this: A pop quiz, she says, is a quiz that you can't know is coming in advance. You reason, however, that such a quiz is impossible, so you never study for it.

Here's your reasoning: The quiz can't be on Friday, because if Wednesday and Thursday go by with no quiz, then you would know it was coming on Friday, since that would be the last possible day. So Friday's out. But that means it can't be on Thursday either, because by the end of class on Wednesday, you would know the quiz would be happening the next day. But since it can't be on Thursday or Friday, it also can't be on Wednesday, because that's the only day left – so you would know in advance that it was coming.

14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Conspiracy Theories & Epistemic Responsibility. Part 1/2. 14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Teorías de la Conspiración y Responsabilidad Epistémica. Parte 1/2. 14a. Anti-vaxxers, théories du complot et responsabilité épistémique - Partie 1/2. 14a.アンチ・ヴァクサー、陰謀論と認識論的責任。パート1/2. 14a. 백신 반대론자, 음모론 및 인식론적 책임. 1/2부. 14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Samenzweringstheorieën & Epistemische Verantwoordelijkheid. Deel 1/2. 14a. Antyszczepionkowcy, teorie spiskowe i odpowiedzialność epistemiczna. Część 1/2. 14a. Anti-Vaxxers, Teorias da Conspiração e Responsabilidade Epistémica. Parte 1/2. 14a. Антивакцинаторы, теории заговора и эпистемическая ответственность. Часть 1/2. 14a. Антиваксісти, теорії змови та епістемічна відповідальність. Частина 1/2. 14a. 反疫苗者、阴谋论和认知责任。第 1/2 部分。

Crash Course Philosophy is brought to you by Squarespace. Squarespace: share your passion with the world.

For generations, just about everybody in the United States got vaccinations. And I'm sure there will be no conversation about this in the comments. And as a result, diseases like measles were all but eradicated.

But in 1998, a study published in a scientific journal linked vaccines with autism. Even though that study was later discredited, ever since then, a small but vocal subset of parents have refused to vaccinate their kids.

Now, measles are back, as is whooping cough, mumps, and other diseases that were nearly wiped out. 现在,麻疹、百日咳、腮腺炎等疾病又回来了,这些疾病曾经几乎被消灭。 Children's lives are being endangered because some parents are acting on beliefs that have no scientific evidence to support them. 一些家长基于没有科学证据支持的信念行动,危及儿童的生命。 So, why am I talking about this on Crash Course Philosophy? 那么,我为什么要在《碰撞课程哲学》中谈论这个问题呢? Normally, when we talk about responsibility, we're talking about things that you do. But in philosophy, we sometimes face other obligations. Some philosophers have argued that we all have epistemic responsibility – that is, responsibility we have regarding our beliefs. 一些哲学家认为,我们所有人都有认识责任 - 即,我们对信仰的责任。

Epistemic responsibility is an especially interesting area of philosophy because it's where many of its sub-disciplines overlap – where epistemology brushes up against philosophy of religion, which bumps into ethics. 认识责任是哲学中特别有趣的领域,因为它是许多子学科重叠的地方 - 认识论与宗教哲学相交,后者又与伦理学相碰。 And philosophers might argue that we live in a world that could probably use a lot more epistemic responsibility – or at least, more people who understand what it is. 哲学家可能会认为我们生活在一个可能需要更多认识责任的世界 - 或者至少更多了解认识责任是什么的人。 Anti-vaxxers, climate change deniers, conspiracy theorists. 反疫苗者、气候变化否认者、阴谋论者。

The world is full of people who hold beliefs without any evidence. 世界上充满了不具有任何证据支持的信仰的人。 And not only that, they – like most of us – encourage others to share their beliefs. 而且,他们不仅如此,他们 - 就像我们大多数人一样 - 鼓励其他人分享他们的信仰。 But over the past 200 years or so, philosophers have developed some pretty compelling responses to this phenomenon. 然而,在过去的大约200年中,哲学家们已经提出了一些相当具有说服力的回应这一现象的观点。

A few thinkers have come up with useful ways of thinking about the beliefs we have, and the harm they can cause, and what responsibilities go along with having them. 少数思想家提出了一些有用的方法来思考我们所拥有的信念,它们可能造成的伤害,以及拥有这些信念所带来的责任。 Meanwhile, others have argued that we can sometimes hold beliefs without any proof. 与此同时,其他人则认为我们有时可以在没有任何证据的情况下持有信念。 Not about vaccines, or global warming, or the moon landing – but about God.

[Theme Music]

W.K. Clifford lived in England in the mid-1800s, where the only vaccine that existed was for smallpox, and even that earned its share of scorn and ridicule at the time. Clifford vivió en Inglaterra a mediados del siglo XIX, donde la única vacuna que existía era la de la viruela, e incluso ésta se ganó el desprecio y la burla de la época. 克利福德生活在19世纪中叶的英格兰,那时唯一存在的疫苗是天花疫苗,即使那个时候,它也饱受争议和嘲笑。 But Clifford, who was both a mathematician and a philosopher, would probably have some very strong opinions about today's anti-vaxxers. 但克利福德是一位数学家和哲学家,可能对今天的反疫苗人士有一些非常强烈的看法。 Because Clifford was one of the leading proponents of epistemic responsibility of his time. 因为克利福德是他那个时代知识责任的主要倡导者之一。 He most famously, and bluntly, put it this way:  “It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” And instead of using vaccinations as an example, Clifford told the story of a ship owner. 他最有名的、也是最直接的表达方式是:“无论何时何地,任何人都相信任何事情缺乏充分证据都是错误的。” 克利福德没有选择使用疫苗作为例子,而是讲述了一个船主的故事。 He said, suppose there was a guy who owned a ship that he knew was old and decrepit and hadn't been inspected in a long time. 他说,假设有个人拥有一艘他知道很旧、破旧且很久没有进行检验的船。 That ship was scheduled to make a transatlantic voyage, and the owner worried that it might not make it. 那艘船计划要进行一次横跨大西洋的航行,船主担心它可能无法完成。 But, overhauling the ship would be pricey and time-consuming. In time, the owner talked himself into believing that the ship was seaworthy. The ship set sail. Then it sank. And hundreds of people drowned. But, the owner? He collected insurance money from his loss, and no one blamed him for the tragedy. 他从自己的损失中获得了保险金,没有人因这场悲剧责怪他。

Now, most people would agree that the shipowner was responsible for the deaths of the ship's passengers. 现在,大多数人都会同意船东对船上乘客的死亡负有责任。 But Clifford went even further. 但克利福德更进一步。 He argued that the owner would have been guilty even if the ship managed to make the trip safely. 他认为即使船只平安抵达目的地,船主也会有罪。 Because: He was guilty of accepting a belief without sufficient evidence, and whether that actually leads to harm or not, he has still done wrong, epistemically and morally. 因为:他有罪是因为在没有足够证据的情况下接受了一种信念,无论是否实际造成了伤害,他仍然犯了错误,无论是认识论上还是道德上。

Now, you might argue, “Don't I have the right to believe whatever I want, as long as it doesn't hurt anyone?” Yeah, good question. 现在,你可能会争辩说,“我难道没有权利相信我想相信的任何事吗,只要不伤害任何人?”是的,好问题。 Clifford argued that there's no such thing as a private belief. Because: We all talk about our beliefs – some of us do it a lot – and it causes our beliefs to spread. But even if you never vocalize a belief, it still influences the way you act and the way others perceive you.

So in this way, a belief can spread subtly, insidiously, without a word being spoken. Think about other kinds of beliefs that lack evidence, for example sexist beliefs. Imagine a modern day sexist in an American university. Imagina a un sexista moderno en una universidad estadounidense. 想象一下在美国大学里的一个现代性别歧视者。 Most of these people are gonna know that actually expressing their sexist views isn't going to fly. 这些人中的大部分人都会知道,实际上表达他们的性别歧视观点不会被接受。 But a sexist's beliefs, even if they're never overtly stated, tend to show through in the ways they interact with women and speak of them. 但是,即使一个性别歧视者的信念从未被明示,他们与女性互动的方式和谈论她们的方式也会透露出来。 So, no matter what: You know them and you know their views and you know their views subtly influence others, particularly if they're a person in position of authority or respect. Since our views always have the potential to harm others, W. K. Clifford argued that we have an epistemic responsibility only to believe things for which we have evidence. 由于我们的观点总是有潜在的伤害他人的可能性,W.K.克利福德认为我们只有在有证据支持的情况下才有认识责任。 And if you don't have evidence, you're morally obligated to refrain from the belief. 如果你没有证据,道德上有义务不持有这个信念。 Basically, you should withhold judgment until you investigate the situation. 基本上,你应该在调查清楚情况之前保持审慎的判断。

Let's head over to the Thought Bubble to explore this more with some Flash Philosophy. 让我们前往思维泡泡,通过一些闪电哲学来深入探讨一下。 It's Tuesday, and your teacher tells you that, this week, there will be a pop quiz. 今天是星期二,你的老师告诉你,本周将进行一次突击测验。 And she's nice enough to even define for you what she means by this: 她还友善地为你定义了她所指的内容: A pop quiz, she says, is a quiz that you can't know is coming in advance. 她说,突然提出的测验是你无法提前知道的测验。 You reason, however, that such a quiz is impossible, so you never study for it. Sin embargo, tú razonas que ese examen es imposible, así que nunca estudias para él. 然而,你理由是这样的测验是不可能的,所以你从来不会为它学习。

Here's your reasoning: The quiz can't be on Friday, because if Wednesday and Thursday go by with no quiz, then you would know it was coming on Friday, since that would be the last possible day. Este es tu razonamiento: el examen no puede ser el viernes, porque si el miércoles y el jueves no hay examen, sabrías que es el viernes, ya que sería el último día posible. 你的推理是:这个测验不可能是在星期五,因为如果星期三和星期四过去了,却没有测验,那么你就会知道测验会在星期五出现,因为那是最后可能的一天。 So Friday's out. But that means it can't be on Thursday either, because by the end of class on Wednesday, you would know the quiz would be happening the next day. Pero eso significa que tampoco puede ser el jueves, porque al final de la clase del miércoles, sabrías que el examen sería al día siguiente. But since it can't be on Thursday or Friday, it also can't be on Wednesday, because that's the only day left – so you would know in advance that it was coming. Pero como no puede ser el jueves ni el viernes, tampoco puede ser el miércoles, porque es el único día que queda, así que sabrías de antemano que va a llegar.