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Inter-War Period (between WW 1 and II), Why the Nazis Weren’t Socialists - ‘The Good Hitler Years’ | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1937 Part 2 of 2 - YouTube (1)

Why the Nazis Weren't Socialists - ‘The Good Hitler Years' | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1937 Part 2 of 2 - YouTube (1)

Pyramid schemes, systematic robbery, extortion, rackets, security money, sham unions, cartels,

price fixing, drug dealing, and sweat shops. No, I'm not talking about the mafia, I'm

talking about Nazi German economic practices of the 1930s. Not socialist, not capitalist, simply criminal.

Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all

facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's

descent into the darkness of the Second World War. I'm Indy Neidell.

The so called ‘good Hitler years' in the mid to late 1930s still persist as a myth,

but upon closer scrutiny the myth falls apart. There's also a more recent myth, or political

fallacy, that the Nazis were fiscally left wing, even socialists - which is based on

what some of them said, but never actually did. In extremely simplified terms, Hitler's

economic ideology is based on the idea of growth through conquest, 'Lebensraum'

for the German nation. To perform this conquest, however, he needs strong economic growth and

increased resources, which can only be won by conquest. That's a circular self-referencing

system that cannot work. More than anything, though, the Nazi economy is structured like

a gigantic organized crime syndicate created to enrich not the state, or the race, but

the Nazi leaders and their capos. In essence, the German economy of the 1930s is built to

fail, and it will have far reaching consequences if Germany should go to war.

Now, we have looked at the German economy in episodes of this going back 20 years. To

say that it has been a roller coaster ride would be an understatement at best. More like

a wild boom and bust ride through several perfect storms. The long and short of it is

that by 1936, Germany has been on and over the brink of economic catastrophe twice since

the end of The Great War. The first crisis is the self inflicted hyperinflation of 1923,

but the recovery form that crisis is equally self made, and it creates the golden years

of asymmetric recovery that last almost up to the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The most

recent crisis in 1930 and 1931 isn't purely self inflicted as the world global financial

crisis strikes, but Chancellor Heinrich Brüning manages to make it much worse as he more or

less single handedly destroys any capacity to deal with the world crisis in order to

get the Nazis to shut up about reparations.

But then came the Nazis and fixed it, right?

Well, no. What really happened is that despite the gridlock of the Reichstag, the chaos of

the financial world falling apart, unclarity about wartime reparations, and more or less

no mandate to govern, the cabinet of Chancellor Franz von Papen, for all his shortcomings,

manages to turn Germany back onto the path to recovery a whole year before the Nazis

seize power. It's not rocket science - they simply repeal the Brüning austerity measures,

they lower taxes, they reinstitute unemployment protections, and they start public works back

up again.

But Papen doesn't get much credit for this as it's happening - in July 1932 he renegotiates

the payment schedules of reparations, and although it indefinitely extends a moratorium,

it does contain a remainder of 3 billion Dollars to be paid at some point. The public is outraged

and the recovery measures go unnoticed just then, but by the end of 1932 the recovery

is felt in the wallets of the public. Unemployment is finally dropping and GDP is rising again.

According to some analysis this contributes to the decline in votes the Nazis capture

in the November elections. But as we know, Papen's next move is to help Hitler seize

power. So contrary to popular belief, Hitler does not inherit an economy in free fall.

And at his side he has one of the architects of German economic success in the 1920s, who

has now become the banker of the Nazis.

He is Hjalmar Schacht, a well connected financier with a colorful past. During the great War

he went from deputy director of the big national bank Dresdner Bank to Banking Commissioner

of occupied Belgium- a position from which he is fired when it becomes clear that he

has been channeling state money destined for purchase in Belgium through Dresdner Bank

to profit from the transfer fees. Despite this, he becomes part of the Weimar administration

after the war. In 1923 during hyperinflation he is one of the architects of the recovery

plan and the new gold standard currency, the Rentenmark and starts serving as President

of the Reichsbank in November that year. He has connections to international businessmen,

politicians and financiers like US banker J.P Morgan, and Governor of the Bank of England,

Montagu Norman, a close personal friend. He is instrumental in negotiating the changes

to reparation plans and manages German monetary policy into the Golden Twenties. He is also

instrumental in financing for big corporations like IG Farben, and a proponent of capital

cartel building to concentrate financial power for growth.

His political views are fairly mainstream and initially liberal democratic. In 1918

he cofounds the center right German Democratic Party the DDP. He is not an anti-Semite and

will in fact become one of the only vocal critics of the Nazi persecution of the Jews

who does not lose his position or end up in the concentration camps. Well, okay, he will

end up there in 1944, but for being a passive supporter in the July 19 assassination attempt

on Hitler. Anyway, by 1926 he has growing concerns about the inclusion of Socialists

in the Weimar Republic administration, and about increased public spending. He is also

becoming convinced that he only way for Germany to regain position on the international stage

is aggressive financial growth by slashing interest rates below sustainability, and rearmament

to boost industry and regain respect, both of which require actions forbidden under the

Versailles Treaty. He leaves the DDP and becomes an independent.

In September 1930, he resigns as President of the Reichsbank in protest against modification

by the administration to the renegotiated reparations under the new Young Plan, which

he has co-created. The global economy is now in crisis and Schacht sees this as an opportunity

for Germany to take action. Historian Amos E Simpson and Schacht biographer puts it this

way: ”as the powers became more involved in their own economic problems in 1931 and

1932 ... a strong government based on a broad national movement could use the existing conditions

to regain Germany's sovereignty and equality as a world power.” Although Schacht does

not go through a real shift of ideology, he is now ready to back Hitler, whom he has come

to believe fulfills those criteria. It is Schacht that rounds up the support of industrialists

and financiers that Hitler needs to seize power, by introducing Hitler to the business

world. Hitler impresses leading German capitalists by reassuring them that no Socialist measures

will come with from a government of the National Socialist Party. During the December 1932

/ January 1933 political gridlock it is Schacht that puts together the broad petition from

top businessmen to President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. He now becomes

Hitler main financial advisor and will be the architect of the Nazi Economy. Schacht

doesn't join the Nazi Party, but still, in March 1933 he is again made President of

the Reichsbank, and in August 1934 he is made Reich Minister of Economics.

Hitler and Schacht is a match made in heaven, or hell depending on how you look at it.

The vision they share is of a German economy let loose to prosper. Hitler, because he has

a magical belief in that there is some natural destiny for success of the German race, and

if you just get rid of all the things that he believes that stands in its way - the Jews,

liberalism, and Bolshevism - success is inevitable, no matter what. Schacht, a bit more astute,

believes that in a deregulated, finance friendly market, the power of big corporations can

prosper and strengthen the economy as a whole.

They have a problem though. Germany has since the 1880s been a Social Market Economy. Which

is like a Free Market Economy with an addition of a moderate amount of labor laws, union

rights and social security, as well as strong anti-trust legislation to stop cartel building,

price fixing etc. This is a construction created by the Conservative Chancellor Bismarck back

then in order to make some concessions to liberals and socialists, and stop a drift

to the left. It has been largely successful. The socialist tendencies of left-wing components

of the Weimar administrations, and the need to prop up business during the years of crisis

has also resulted in an increase in the number of nationalized businesses, though. That all

needs to go.

In May 1933 all unions are abolished and replaced with the Deutsche Arbeitsfront DAF, a sham

single union within the Nazi Party that is meant to give workers a feeling that the party

works and cares for them. In reality Schacht is repealing labor protection laws en masse

like limits on part time work, limits on overtime, sectional minimum wages, furlough protection,

notice times, and so on. They mask it by upholding unemployment benefits and with cosmetic programs

like DAF travels, that only really benefit very few. Although wages will go up under

the Nazis, they will never return to pre-Nazi levels as share of GDP. Unemployment will

also continue to decrease, but that is partly due to more part time employment, eliminating

swaths of the public, like Women, political dissidents and Jews form the unemployment

statistics. The number of women in the German workforce will not return to 1927 levels until

the 1950s, not even during the coming war years.

Next, they get rid of almost all anti-trust laws and encourage big businesses to form

cartels to protect their market position inland and abroad. This is basically a carte blanche

for a small group of capital holders to print money for themselves without having to care

about fair business practices. In exchange, the corporations subjugate themselves to ideological

oversight so that no ‘un-German' aspects creep into their business practices. Things

like trading with Jewish businesses, allowing liberal politically minded employees, employing

married women and so on. The ideological oversight also inserts political education into corporate

culture so that workers are kept in line with Nazi doctrine.

They also slash taxes for big business in the cartels. To offset this loss they increase

corporate gains taxes for small to medium enterprises, and companies that don't join

the cartels. In industries that they don't consider valuable to the Nazi ideology, or

don't contribute to the aggressive growth towards an international position of respect,

they even tax gross revenue instead of profits. And then they start a massive privatization

program. The constant sale of government owned business provides between one and three percent

of the entire annual budget. And they need the money to invest in massive public works

to create better infrastructure and more than anything - rearmament.

This does keep the economic wheels of recovery spinning, but it also has another effect.

Coupled with the decentralized, extreme freedom of local party leaders to define the law,

the liberalization of all legal regulation opens up the economy to be robbed by the party.

Party executives like Göring, Hitler, and Goebbels enrich themselves by paying out extraordinary

salaries and bonuses, seizing business for themselves and simply stealing expropriated

goods. On the regional and local levels, Gauleiters and party functionaries extort, blackmail

and steal land, money and valuables as they like. Criminals from outside of the party

are, on the other hand, harshly punished, creating the false feeling that crime is going

down.

Schacht and Hitler are also running a criminal scam to circumvent the limitations on financing

rearmament. The MEFO Bills are government bonds that have no real backing in the economy.

Basically, they are selling junk bonds at a high price to the German people. But it

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Why the Nazis Weren't Socialists - ‘The Good Hitler Years' | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1937 Part 2 of 2 - YouTube (1) 为什么|||||||||||||| ||Nazis|||||||||||| por qué|||||||||||||| Warum die Nazis keine Sozialisten waren - 'Die guten Hitlerjahre' | ZWISCHEN 2 KRIEGEN I 1937 Teil 2 von 2 - YouTube (1) Por qué los nazis no eran socialistas - 'Los buenos años de Hitler' | ENTRE 2 GUERRAS I 1937 Parte 2 de 2 - YouTube (1) Pourquoi les nazis n'étaient pas socialistes - 'Les bonnes années d'Hitler' | ENTRE LES 2 GUERRES I 1937 Partie 2 de 2 - YouTube (1) Perché i nazisti non erano socialisti - 'Gli anni del buon Hitler' | TRA 2 GUERRE I 1937 Parte 2 di 2 - YouTube (1) なぜナチスは社会主義者ではなかったのか - 『良きヒトラーの時代』|BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1937 Part 2 of 2 - YouTube (1) Porque é que os nazis não eram socialistas - 'Os bons anos de Hitler' | ENTRE 2 GUERRAS I 1937 Parte 2 de 2 - YouTube (1) Почему нацисты не были социалистами - "Хорошие годы Гитлера" | BETWEEN 2 WARS I 1937 Part 2 of 2 - YouTube (1) Naziler Neden Sosyalist Değildi - 'İyi Hitler Yılları' | 2 SAVAŞ ARASI I 1937 Bölüm 2 / 2 - YouTube (1) Чому нацисти не були соціалістами - "Добрі роки Гітлера" | МІЖ 2 ВІЙНАМИ I 1937 Частина 2 з 2 - YouTube (1) 为什么纳粹不是社会主义者 - “美好的希特勒岁月”|第一次世界大战 1937 年(第 2 部分,共 2 部分) - YouTube (1)

Pyramid schemes, systematic robbery, extortion, rackets, security money, sham unions, cartels, 金字塔|骗局|系统性的|抢劫|敲诈|黑社会|||假||卡特尔 |||||illegal enterprises|protection money||fake|| |||robo sistemático||Estafas organizadas|||Farsa|sindicatos falsos|

price fixing, drug dealing, and sweat shops. No, I'm not talking about the mafia, I'm 价格||毒品|||血汗||||||||黑手党| cost manipulation||illegal substances|||labor exploitation||||||||| precio|fijación de precios|droga|tráfico|y|explotación laboral|||||||||

talking about Nazi German economic practices of the 1930s. Not socialist, not capitalist, simply criminal.

Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all |||||||||entre-deux-guer||| ||||||ملخص|||بين الحربين||| |||||||||interwar years|||

facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's aspects|||||||||| aspects|||||||||| ||||عدم اليقين|اللذة|و|النشوة||في النهاية|

descent into the darkness of the Second World War. I'm Indy Neidell. fall||||||||||| |||||||||||نييدل

The so called ‘good Hitler years' in the mid to late 1930s still persist as a myth, ||||||在|||||||持续||| ||||||||منتصف|||||تستمر|||أسطورة |||||||||||||continue to exist|||

but upon closer scrutiny the myth falls apart. There's also a more recent myth, or political ||更仔细|审视|||||||||||| mais||||||s'effondre||||||||| |on|||||||||||||| |||التدقيق الدقيق||||||||||||

fallacy, that the Nazis were fiscally left wing, even socialists - which is based on 谬论|||||财政上|||||||| ||||étaient||||||||| خرافة|||||مالياً|||||||| |||||financially|||||||| ||||||izquierda política|ala izquierda||||||

what some of them said, but never actually did. In extremely simplified terms, Hitler's ||||||||||بشكل مبسط للغاية|مبسطة للغاية|مصطلحات مبس|

economic ideology is based on the idea of growth through conquest, 'Lebensraum' |||||||||||生存空间 ||||||||||الفتح| ||||||||||expansion| ||||||||crecimiento mediante conquista||conquista, 'Lebensraum'|Espacio vital

for the German nation. To perform this conquest, however, he needs strong economic growth and

increased resources, which can only be won by conquest. That's a circular self-referencing |||||||||||循环|自我| ||||||||||||self-referencing|

system that cannot work. More than anything, though, the Nazi economy is structured like ||||More than anything|||||||||

a gigantic organized crime syndicate created to enrich not the state, or the race, but |巨大的||| syndicate||||||||||

the Nazi leaders and their capos. In essence, the German economy of the 1930s is built to |||||看守||||||||||| |||||assistants|||||||||||

fail, and it will have far reaching consequences if Germany should go to war. ||||||far-reaching|||||||

Now, we have looked at the German economy in episodes of this going back 20 years. To ||||||||||||over|||

say that it has been a roller coaster ride would be an understatement at best. More like ||||||过山车|||||||||| dire||||||montagnes russes|||conditionnel||||||| ||||||||experience||||understatement|||| ||||||||||||eufemismo|||| ||||||montanha-russa||||||||||

a wild boom and bust ride through several perfect storms. The long and short of it is |疯狂的||||||||||||||| |intense|surge|and|bust|experience||||situations||summary|||||

that by 1936, Germany has been on and over the brink of economic catastrophe twice since ||||||||这|||||| ||Allemagne|a||||au-dessus||||||| |||||on||||verge|||||

the end of The Great War. The first crisis is the self inflicted hyperinflation of 1923, |||||||||||自我|||

but the recovery form that crisis is equally self made, and it creates the golden years ||||||||self-made|||||||

of asymmetric recovery that last almost up to the Wall Street Crash of 1929. The most |不对称||||||||||||| de|||||||||||||| |uneven|||||||||||||

recent crisis in 1930 and 1931 isn't purely self inflicted as the world global financial

crisis strikes, but Chancellor Heinrich Brüning manages to make it much worse as he more or |hits|||||||||||||does more|less

less single handedly destroys any capacity to deal with the world crisis in order to ||单独|||||||||||| moins||à lui seul|||||||||||| less||single-handedly|||||||||||| |||||||enfrentar|||||||

get the Nazis to shut up about reparations. ||||stop talking|||reparations

But then came the Nazis and fixed it, right? ||||||took control of||

Well, no. What really happened is that despite the gridlock of the Reichstag, the chaos of |||||||||僵局|||||| ||Ce que||||que|||paralysie|||||| |||||||||stalemate|||German parliament||| |||||||a pesar de||atasco político||||||

the financial world falling apart, unclarity about wartime reparations, and more or less la|||||incertitude|sur|||||| |||declining||uncertainty|||||additional topics||

no mandate to govern, the cabinet of Chancellor Franz von Papen, for all his shortcomings, |authority||||government body||||||in light of|despite||failings

manages to turn Germany back onto the path to recovery a whole year before the Nazis ||||||||||||||la|

seize power. It's not rocket science - they simply repeal the Brüning austerity measures, ||||||ils||abrogent|||| take||||||||revoke||Brüning austerity|economic measures|policies

they lower taxes, they reinstitute unemployment protections, and they start public works back ||||重新实施|||||||| |||ils|réinstaurent|||||||| ||||||||||public works||

up again.

But Papen doesn't get much credit for this as it's happening - in July 1932 he renegotiates

the payment schedules of reparations, and although it indefinitely extends a moratorium, |||||||||||暂停 |payment|payment plans||||||without end|||pause

it does contain a remainder of 3 billion Dollars to be paid at some point. The public is outraged ||includes||balance|||||||||||||angry ||||remanente|||||||||||||indignado/a

and the recovery measures go unnoticed just then, but by the end of 1932 the recovery |||||unnoticed|at that moment||||||||

is felt in the wallets of the public. Unemployment is finally dropping and GDP is rising again. ||在|公用|||||失业|||||||| |||||||||||||Gross Domestic Product|||

According to some analysis this contributes to the decline in votes the Nazis capture |||||||||||(定冠词)||

in the November elections. But as we know, Papen's next move is to help Hitler seize

power. So contrary to popular belief, Hitler does not inherit an economy in free fall. |||||||||继承||经济||| |||||||||receive|||||

And at his side he has one of the architects of German economic success in the 1920s, who |||||||||建筑师||||||||

has now become the banker of the Nazis. ||||financial supporter|||Nazis

He is Hjalmar Schacht, a well connected financier with a colorful past. During the great War |||||||financial expert|||vivid|history||||

he went from deputy director of the big national bank Dresdner Bank to Banking Commissioner ||||||||||德累斯顿|||| |||deputy||||||||||the banking sector|Banking Commissioner

of occupied Belgium- a position from which he is fired when it becomes clear that he |被占领的|||||||||||||| |occupied||||||||||||||

has been channeling state money destined for purchase in Belgium through Dresdner Bank ||转移|||||||||| a|||||||||||| ||redirecting|||||acquisition||||| ||desviando|||||compra|||||

to profit from the transfer fees. Despite this, he becomes part of the Weimar administration |||||||||||||魏玛| à|||||frais||||||||| ||||transfer|||||||||Weimar Republic| |beneficiarse|||||||||||||

after the war. In 1923 during hyperinflation he is one of the architects of the recovery

plan and the new gold standard currency, the Rentenmark and starts serving as President |||||standard||||||||

of the Reichsbank in November that year. He has connections to international businessmen, ||||||||||||business leaders

politicians and financiers like US banker J.P Morgan, and Governor of the Bank of England, ||||||||||Governor of the Bank|||||

Montagu Norman, a close personal friend. He is instrumental in negotiating the changes ||||||||key to||||

to reparation plans and manages German monetary policy into the Golden Twenties. He is also

instrumental in financing for big corporations like IG Farben, and a proponent of capital |||||||||||支持者|| |||||||||||advocate for capital||capital investment

cartel building to concentrate financial power for growth. 卡特尔||||||| cartel|formation|||||| |||||||crecimiento financiero

His political views are fairly mainstream and initially liberal democratic. In 1918 |||||widely accepted|||||

he cofounds the center right German Democratic Party the DDP. He is not an anti-Semite and |共同创办||||||||||||||| il|cofonde||||||||||||||| |cofounds|||||||||||||||

will in fact become one of the only vocal critics of the Nazi persecution of the Jews ||||||||声音|||||||| |||||||||||||oppression|||

who does not lose his position or end up in the concentration camps. Well, okay, he will

end up there in 1944, but for being a passive supporter in the July 19 assassination attempt

on Hitler. Anyway, by 1926 he has growing concerns about the inclusion of Socialists ||||他||||||包括||

in the Weimar Republic administration, and about increased public spending. He is also ||Weimar Republic|||||||expenditure|||

becoming convinced that he only way for Germany to regain position on the international stage |||||方法||||恢复|||||

is aggressive financial growth by slashing interest rates below sustainability, and rearmament |||||削减|||低于|可持续性|| |||||cutting|interest rates|||sustainable levels||military buildup

to boost industry and regain respect, both of which require actions forbidden under the |||||||||||禁止|| |promote||||||||||||

Versailles Treaty. He leaves the DDP and becomes an independent.

In September 1930, he resigns as President of the Reichsbank in protest against modification ||||||||||||修改

by the administration to the renegotiated reparations under the new Young Plan, which

he has co-created. The global economy is now in crisis and Schacht sees this as an opportunity

for Germany to take action. Historian Amos E Simpson and Schacht biographer puts it this |||||||||||传记作者||| |||||Historian Amos E Simpson|||||||||

way: ”as the powers became more involved in their own economic problems in 1931 and

1932 ... a strong government based on a broad national movement could use the existing conditions

to regain Germany's sovereignty and equality as a world power.” Although Schacht does |||sovereignty|||||||||

not go through a real shift of ideology, he is now ready to back Hitler, whom he has come |||||||||||||support|||||

to believe fulfills those criteria. It is Schacht that rounds up the support of industrialists ||||标准|||||使得||||| à||remplit|||||||||||| ||||standards|||||gathers|||||

and financiers that Hitler needs to seize power, by introducing Hitler to the business

world. Hitler impresses leading German capitalists by reassuring them that no Socialist measures ||打动|||||||||| ||impresses|||||comforting|||||

will come with from a government of the National Socialist Party. During the December 1932 |arrive||||||||||||

/ January 1933 political gridlock it is Schacht that puts together the broad petition from |||||||||||请愿| ||political stalemate|||||organizes||||request or appeal|

top businessmen to President Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor. He now becomes ||||||designate||||||

Hitler main financial advisor and will be the architect of the Nazi Economy. Schacht |||economic advisor||||||||||

doesn't join the Nazi Party, but still, in March 1933 he is again made President of

the Reichsbank, and in August 1934 he is made Reich Minister of Economics. ||||||||empire|||

Hitler and Schacht is a match made in heaven, or hell depending on how you look at it. |||||pair|||heaven|||||||||

The vision they share is of a German economy let loose to prosper. Hitler, because he has ||||||||||set free||thrive||||

a magical belief in that there is some natural destiny for success of the German race, and

if you just get rid of all the things that he believes that stands in its way - the Jews,

liberalism, and Bolshevism - success is inevitable, no matter what. Schacht, a bit more astute, |||||||||||||机智 ||||||||||un peu plus astuc|||astucieux political ideology|||||||||||||

believes that in a deregulated, finance friendly market, the power of big corporations can ||||放松管制||||||||| ||||without regulations|financial|supportive of finance|environment||||||

prosper and strengthen the economy as a whole.

They have a problem though. Germany has since the 1880s been a Social Market Economy. Which

is like a Free Market Economy with an addition of a moderate amount of labor laws, union ||||||||||||||workforce regulations||labor union

rights and social security, as well as strong anti-trust legislation to stop cartel building, |||||||||||||卡特尔| ||||||||against|||||cartel formation|

price fixing etc. This is a construction created by the Conservative Chancellor Bismarck back |||||||||||||in the past

then in order to make some concessions to liberals and socialists, and stop a drift then||||||||||||||shift

to the left. It has been largely successful. The socialist tendencies of left-wing components

of the Weimar administrations, and the need to prop up business during the years of crisis ||||||||support|||||||

has also resulted in an increase in the number of nationalized businesses, though. That all ||||||||||state-owned||||

needs to go.

In May 1933 all unions are abolished and replaced with the Deutsche Arbeitsfront DAF, a sham ||||||||||||||fake organization

single union within the Nazi Party that is meant to give workers a feeling that the party

works and cares for them. In reality Schacht is repealing labor protection laws en masse |||||||||废除||||| |||||||||||protection du travail||| |||||||||revoking|||||in large numbers

like limits on part time work, limits on overtime, sectional minimum wages, furlough protection, |||||||||分段的|||休假| ||||||||||||protection de congé| |||work|||||extra hours|specific|minimum|minimum wages|leave of absence|

notice times, and so on. They mask it by upholding unemployment benefits and with cosmetic programs ||||||||||||||表面上的| |||||Ils||||maintenant|||||| notice||||||conceal|||maintaining|joblessness||||superficial|

like DAF travels, that only really benefit very few. Although wages will go up under

the Nazis, they will never return to pre-Nazi levels as share of GDP. Unemployment will |||||||||||||Gross Domestic Product|| ||||||||||||||desemprego|

also continue to decrease, but that is partly due to more part time employment, eliminating ||||||est||||||||

swaths of the public, like Women, political dissidents and Jews form the unemployment 一部分|||||||||||| de larges pans|||||||||||| segments||||||||||||

statistics. The number of women in the German workforce will not return to 1927 levels until |La|||||||main-d'œuvre||||||

the 1950s, not even during the coming war years.

Next, they get rid of almost all anti-trust laws and encourage big businesses to form

cartels to protect their market position inland and abroad. This is basically a carte blanche ||||||||||||||白纸 |||||position sur le marché||||||||| ||||||domestically||overseas||||||blank check

for a small group of capital holders to print money for themselves without having to care ||||de||détenteurs||||||||| |||||wealthy||||||||||

about fair business practices. In exchange, the corporations subjugate themselves to ideological ||||||les||se soumettent|||

oversight so that no ‘un-German' aspects creep into their business practices. Things |||||||渗入||||| supervision|||||||infiltrate|||||

like trading with Jewish businesses, allowing liberal politically minded employees, employing

married women and so on. The ideological oversight also inserts political education into corporate |||||||||places||||business

culture so that workers are kept in line with Nazi doctrine. ideology||||||||||

They also slash taxes for big business in the cartels. To offset this loss they increase |||||||||||抵消|||| ||||||||||Pour compenser|compenser|||| ||reduce|||||||||counter||||

corporate gains taxes for small to medium enterprises, and companies that don't join 企业|||||||||||| |taxes|||||||||||

the cartels. In industries that they don't consider valuable to the Nazi ideology, or

don't contribute to the aggressive growth towards an international position of respect,

they even tax gross revenue instead of profits. And then they start a massive privatization ||征税||||||||||||私有化 |||total|||||||||||

program. The constant sale of government owned business provides between one and three percent

of the entire annual budget. And they need the money to invest in massive public works ||||budget|||||||||||

to create better infrastructure and more than anything - rearmament.

This does keep the economic wheels of recovery spinning, but it also has another effect.

Coupled with the decentralized, extreme freedom of local party leaders to define the law, |||去中心化|||||||||| Linked|||||||||||||

the liberalization of all legal regulation opens up the economy to be robbed by the party. |removal of restrictions|||legal|legal regulation||||||||||

Party executives like Göring, Hitler, and Goebbels enrich themselves by paying out extraordinary

salaries and bonuses, seizing business for themselves and simply stealing expropriated ||||||||||被征用 |||||||||voler| |||taking over|||||||stolen property

goods. On the regional and local levels, Gauleiters and party functionaries extort, blackmail ||||||||||官员|| ||||||||||fonctionnaires|| |||||||regional leaders||||coerce for goods|coerce for goods

and steal land, money and valuables as they like. Criminals from outside of the party |||argent||||||||||| |||||valuables||||||||| ||||||||||||||partido político

are, on the other hand, harshly punished, creating the false feeling that crime is going |||||de manière sévère|||||||criminalité||

down.

Schacht and Hitler are also running a criminal scam to circumvent the limitations on financing ||||||||||规避|||| ||Hitler|verbe auxiliaire|||||escroquerie crimin|pour|contourner|||| ||||||||operation||evade||||

rearmament. The MEFO Bills are government bonds that have no real backing in the economy. ||||||government bonds|||||support|||

Basically, they are selling junk bonds at a high price to the German people. But it ||||垃圾|债券|||||||||| |||||debt securities||||||||||