The End of Polish Democracy - Pilsudski and the Sanacja Regime | BETWEEN 2 WARS | 1935 Part 2 of 4 - YouTube (1)
Hitler will call it “a so-called state lacking every national, historical, historical, cultural
and moral foundation.” Molotov will call it “the monstrous bastard of the Peace of
Versailles”. Keynes will call it “an economic impossibility whose only industry is Jew-baiting”.
Others will call it “a farce” or “pathological” or “a historical failure”. The country
these people are all talking about is Poland. By 1935, it has slid into an authoritarian
regime that is looked down upon by almost all of the Great Powers. It is being squeezed
from both sides by powerful aggressors. But how did it get to this point and will it be
able to save itself?
Welcome to Between-2-Wars a chronological summary of the interwar years, covering all
facets of life, the uncertainty, hedonism, and euphoria, and ultimately humanity's
descent into the darkness of the Second World War. I'm Indy Neidell.
If you've been with us since 1921, you'll know that Józef Piłsudski worked to established
the cunningly named Second Polish Republic amid ethnic tension, revolution, and war.
Despite failing to achieve his ultimate goal of a modern-day Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth,
as Chief of State he has crafted a Republic that has gained international recognition
and beaten back numerous enemies. Most impressively, he is responsible for the “Miracle at the
Vistula” against the Soviet army, and this is already rapidly gaining mythic status amongst
the Polish population.
But the shine of independence is quickly rubbing off as Poland finds itself burdened with some
pretty severe problems.
For starters, about one-third of this “Polish” nation-state aren't ethnic Poles. 14% are
Ukrainian, 4% are Belarusians, 2% German, 10% Jewish, and 1% a patchwork of smaller
ethnicities such as Russian, Czech, and Lithuanian. Even amongst the Poles themselves, things
are pretty divided. For over 100 years, the Polish lands had been partitioned by three
separate powers, meaning three different administrative systems, legal codes, and conventions. This
is compounded by economic imbalance. Commentators even talk of a Poland A, referring to the
more well-developed western half of the country, and Poland B, the eastern less-developed half.
The political scene of the Republic is dominated by the National Democracy, known as Endecja,
the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and a group of populist parties representing the peasantry.
The Endecja, led by Roman Dmowski, are the most powerful party in the early-1920s and
are committed to conservative values, patriotism, Catholicism, and a deep-seated intolerance
towards both Jews and Germans. Dmowski himself has always been somewhat of a nemesis to Piłsudski,
whose ambitions of a federalized multi-ethnic commonwealth fly in the face of the Endecja's
‘Poland for the Poles'.
Piłsudski himself has in the past been associated with the PPS, but leaves after independence
to emphasize his role as a non-partisan head of state committed to the nation. The PPS
itself is somewhat of a broad array of groups, incorporating not only socialists, but also
patriotic military-men, liberal intellectuals, ethnic minorities, and anti-clericals. The
peasant movement is made up of three main parties and, as you might have guessed from
the name, draw support for the peasantry. Some have a more left-wing bent and others
a more right-wing one.
So the political life of the Republic is split across several axes. And Piłsudski soon becomes
disillusioned with it all.
He worked hard to forge this new nation-state but is now snubbed by the Sejm (the lower
house of parliament) when they pass the March constitution in 1921. This is thanks to Dmowski
and his Endecja, who ensure that Presidential powers are limited to pretty much ceremonial
duties. Piłsudski declines to run for such a neutered office and, in December 1922, Poland
votes to replace him with socialist-supported Gabriel Narutowicz, a close associate of Piłsudski.
But the Endecja, who themselves had emerged victorious in parliamentary elections the
previous months, roar their disapproval. They denounce Narutowicz as the “Jewish president”
and protest his presidency viciously. In just a matter of days, rhetoric becomes reality
as Narutowicz is shot dead in Warsaw by a painter belonging to the Endecja movement.
Disgusted at how quickly democracy has fallen into chaos, Piłsudski retreats from political
life.
And the next few years will only increase his disillusion.
The economy almost has to be built from scratch. Unrest is frequent in both rural and urban
areas as peasants and workers alike face tough times. Pre-war trading patterns have collapsed,
and hyperinflation is running amuck. Dealing with these problems would be formidable for
any government, but the Polish people find themselves particularly disappointed with
theirs. Proceedings in the Sejm often descended into tumultuous argument, abuse, and even
violence. Accusations of corruption run rampant on all sides and successive governments fail
without passing any significant legislation.
This is not to say the story of Poland's first years is one of failure. Considering
the enormous difficulties the nation inherited, Poland has made admirable progress. In 1924
a single currency, the Zloły, is introduced to replace the six that had previously been
in circulation. A central bank is also established, and politicians work to raise foreign loans.
This, along with increased taxes on the wealthy, gets Poland some badly needed cash for public
investment and some form of economic infrastructure is starting to emerge.
But Poland's fortunes do still look grim, and she has found herself in threatening diplomatic
waters. We already know that her eastern neighbor, Soviet Russia, has a pretty keen interest
in seeing her destroyed, or well, part of Soviet Russia. But her Western neighbor is
just as dangerous, if not more so.
To be honest, the Versailles settlement kind of made this inevitable. The conflict of over
Upper Silesia and the Polish corridor cutting eastern Prussia off from the rest of Germany
means that every German government in this period is committed to revising its post-war
borders. On top of this, the League of Nations-mandated Free City of Danzig causes continual tension.
Its German dominated Senate is deeply hostile to the Polish state and fiercely committed
to keeping the city tied to the German Reich. This is matched by the German population's
hostility to the Polish minority in the city. Danzig also symbolizes German grievances against
Poland and the Versailles decision in general, not just to Germany but to many in the west.
Now, Poland and France do sign an alliance in 1921, providing the former with some form
of assured security. But this means little without similar assurances from Britain, who
aren't really that interested in Eastern Europe. And imagine how the Poles feel in
1922 when their two greatest enemies, Russia and Germany, sign a treaty at Rapallo agreeing
to “co-operate in a spirit of mutual goodwill”. And then in 1925 when Germany first enters
a trade war with Poland and then also refuses to recognize the legitimacy of its eastern
borders during the Locarno negotiations. And then in April 1926 when what-is-now the Soviet
Union and Germany reaffirm good relations with the Treaty of Berlin.
From his retirement, Piłsudski has witnessed all this national insecurity, political strife,
and economic turbulence. Always considering himself as a man of destiny, he decides he
must act, and a significant number of his supporters agree.
By May 1926, the Polish Republic has seen 14 short-lived governments. The election of
the latest one, headed by Wincenty Witos of the peasant movement, sparks protests immediately.
On May 11th, demonstrators gather in Warsaw shouting "Long live Piłsudski! Down with
Witos!”.
Piłsudski sees his chance. The following day he marches with 2000 men to the centre
of Warsaw. His intention is a nonviolent show of force to prove that only he is capable
of saving the nation. But as a general rule governments don't really tend to appreciate
rebellious military officers marching towards them, even if they do so “nonviolently”.
They fight back and three days of violence unfolds. A coup has somehow taken place, some
also call it a civil war, and by the end close to 400 are dead and 1000 wounded. In the early
hours of May 15th, the government calls for a ceasefire and swiftly resigns. Piłsudski
becomes minister of military affairs but refuses the positions of either Prime Minister or
President, preferring instead to fill them with allies.
But what is Piłsudski working towards and how is he going to do it?
It's actually pretty tricky to tell. It's rare for him to make clear policy announcements
or ideological statements. Despite seizing power from an elected government through military
force, Piłsudski is no Mussolini, and he considers himself a democrat at heart. A suitable
phrase to describe his approach might be “guided democracy”. Now, depending on how cynical
or idealistic you are, you might either see this as nothing but a façade for autocracy
or an honest effort to ensure stability in a struggling country. I'll let you guys battle
it out in the comments.
Vagaries aside, there is no question that Piłsudski is fiercely committed to the task
of Sanacja. This means the ‘moral healing' of the nation where corruption is eliminated,
productive citizenship is revered, and the Polish state is elevated above all else. This
mainly takes the form of rooting out corruption and securing the cooperation of the army and
landed classes. Constitutional amendments are also passed to strengthen the executive
and weaken the Sejm. Government roles are filled with close alliues, mainly military
men imbued with a strong sense of order, virtue, and purpose.
Piłsudski wants to re-shape the entire political system. But he wishes to do so in an at least
semi-democratic way. This does little to calm the fears of Piłsudski's growing left-wing
opposition who group together in 1929 to form the Centrolew alliance. They assemble in June
1930 to draft their manifesto. It declares that Poland has come under the personal dictatorship
of Piłsudski, with elected governments only masking this. They proclaim their ultimate
goal to be the removal of Piłsudski from power and the reintroduction of genuine parliamentary
democracy. And any attempt at state terrorism will be met with psychical force. The reaction
comes some months later, but comes harshly. In September the leaders are rounded up and
confined to a military prison until after new elections have taken place. In October,
military officers armed with revolvers and drawn swords attend the opening of the session
of Sejm.
The conservative opposition have fared no better in all this. They too have faced undemocratic
maneuvering, and their primary vehicle for resistance is sliding into disarray. Dmowski
established the Camp of Great Poland, and it does boast relatively good membership numbers,
but its effectiveness is limited, and it is increasingly drifting into hysterical xenophobia
and racism. The fact that left-wing and right-wing opposition hate each other just as much as
they do the Sanacja regime means Piłsudski can steer a clear path between them both.
And so with the next elections in November 1930, the BBWR shoot to victory with 56% of
the vote. This is the Non-Party Block for Cooperation with the government, set up by
Pilsudski's allies in 1927.
They took none of the chances now that they did then when they took just a quarter of
the vote, arresting more opposition leaders and cancelling candidacies.
The following years see the Sanacja regime take on an even more authoritarian character.
In 1932, over 50 professors are dismissed from university positions for their opposition
sympathies. In 1933, the Camp of Great Poland is banned, and the leaders of the Centrolew
alliance face sentences of either imprisonment or exile. Things ramp up even more in 1934
when a detention camp for political dissidents is established in Bereza Kartuska. Conditions
are exceptionally harsh, and torture is common. The death count is officially pretty low,
but this is more to do with the authorities tactic of releasing prisoners who are at deaths
door.
While Piłsudski's domestic policy is becoming more and more openly authoritarian, he is
balancing his foreign one a bit more delicately.
